I’VE GOT MY AI ON YOU: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE LAW ENFORCEMENT DOMAIN by Baker, Eric M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2021-03
IVE GOT MY AI ON YOU: ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE IN THE LAW ENFORCEMENT DOMAIN
Baker, Eric M.
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/67100
Copyright is reserved by the copyright owner.






I’VE GOT MY AI ON YOU: ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE IN THE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
DOMAIN 
by 
Eric M. Baker 
March 2021 
Co-Advisors: Erik J. Dahl 
Anthony Canan 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions 
for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson 
Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank)  
2. REPORT DATE 
 March 2021  
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
 Master’s thesis 
 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
I’VE GOT MY AI ON YOU: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT DOMAIN 
 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
  
 6. AUTHOR(S) Eric M. Baker 
 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
 8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 
 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
 10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.  
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)     
 Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems provide a unique problem for users in the law enforcement domain. 
On one hand, AI systems provide an opportunity for optimizations and faster workflows, especially in the 
environment of growing data. On the other hand if left unchecked, AI systems have the potential to 
negatively affect the community served by law enforcement. This research focuses on three types of AI 
systems currently used by law enforcement: facial recognition, predictive risk assessments, and predictive 
policing. By looking at these three types of AI systems, this research attempts to evaluate the effectiveness 
of the technology while maintaining the privacy, fairness, transparency, and accountability expected by the 
public. These three case studies show how AI systems can have a negative impact on individuals identified 
via AI systems and the need for further research into effective measures to regulate the technology. 
Additionally, the European Union is currently working on potential frameworks for responsible 
implementation of AI systems, which provide a template for future efforts in the United States. 
 14. SUBJECT TERMS 
artificial intelligence, machine learning, AI 
 
 15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
 97 
 16. PRICE CODE 




 18. SECURITY 
CLASSIFICATION OF THIS 
PAGE 
Unclassified 








NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
I’VE GOT MY AI ON YOU: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT DOMAIN 
Eric M. Baker 
Intelligence Systems Analyst, Texas Department of Public Safety 
BS, University of Texas, 2010 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
March 2021 
Approved by: Erik J. Dahl 
 Co-Advisor 
 Anthony Canan 
 Co-Advisor 
 Erik J. Dahl 
 Associate Professor, Department of National Security Affairs 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
 Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems provide a unique problem for users in the law 
enforcement domain. On one hand, AI systems provide an opportunity for optimizations 
and faster workflows, especially in the environment of growing data. On the other hand, 
if left unchecked AI systems have the potential to negatively affect the community served 
by law enforcement. This research focuses on three types of AI systems currently used by 
law enforcement: facial recognition, predictive risk assessments, and predictive policing. 
By looking at these three types of AI systems, this research attempts to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the technology while maintaining the privacy, fairness, transparency, and 
accountability expected by the public. These three case studies show how AI systems can 
have a negative impact on individuals identified via AI systems and the need for further 
research into effective measures to regulate the technology. Additionally, the European 
Union is currently working on potential frameworks for responsible implementation of 
AI systems, which provide a template for future efforts in the United States. 
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Law enforcement is facing a common problem found in the twenty-first century: 
an expansive growth of data and limited personnel to extract useful trends and analyses 
from it.1 The development of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, such as facial recognition 
and machine learning, present useful tools to address this issue. However, AI systems 
provide a unique problem for users in the law enforcement domain. On one hand, AI 
systems provide an opportunity for optimizations and faster workflows, especially in the 
environment of growing data. On the other hand if left unchecked, AI systems have the 
potential to negatively affect the community served by law enforcement. These negative 
effects come in the form of bias and inaccuracies within the systems and secondary effects 
that are not initially obvious when using AI systems.2 This begs the question, “How does 
law enforcement usage of artificial intelligence systems impact the communities they 
serve?” 
This thesis looks at three current uses of AI systems in the law enforcement domain: 
facial recognition, predictive risk assessments, and predictive policing. These cases are 
examined by their effectiveness, fairness, privacy, transparency, and accountability to 
determine how law enforcements’ usage impacts their respective communities. When 
looking at each type of AI system through these criteria, it becomes clear that there are 
significant considerations to have when using these systems. Without proper policies and 
regulations in place, AI systems can lead to unjust arrests, unfairly target specific 
classifications of people, or just may not meaningfully enhance law enforcement 
operations. Other considerations, such as the Fourth and Fourteenth Constitutional 
Amendments that provide protections against unreasonable search and seizure and 
establishes due process, need to be taken into account due to the potential of AI systems to 
undermine constitutional protections afforded to individuals.  
1 John Hollywood et al., Addressing Emerging Trends to Support the Future of Criminal Justice: 
Findings of the Criminal Justice Technology Forecasting Group (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), 
https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1987. 
2 Osonde Osoba and William Welser, The Risks of Artificial Intelligence to Security and the Future of 
Work, PE-237-RC (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), https://doi.org/10.7249/PE237. 
xiv 
These factors do not mean AI systems are doomed or should not be used in the law 
enforcement domain. However, these findings point to the need for additional research to 
be conducted into responsible ways for this technology to be used by law enforcement in 
ways that do not negative impact their communities. Additionally, this is an emerging 
technology with new development and discoveries on a regular basis. As such, the 
government is in a perpetual game of cat and mouse, which has led to some municipalities 
banning the technology outright. Rather than banning the technology, frameworks should 
be developed to ensure AI systems are used in a responsible manner. The European Union 
is currently developing a framework with the intention to prevent many of the negative 
components of AI systems.3 This work can potentially serve as a starting ground for similar 
policies and regulations for law enforcement in the United States. 
3 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI: High-
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I. INTRODUCTION
Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are becoming an ever-present fixture in our 
society. Whether people realize it or not, it is quite likely the average person interacts with 
some form of an AI system on a regular basis. AI systems power facial recognition software 
used to automatically unlock mobile devices, virtual assistants found in household devices, 
and can even be used to diagnose medical conditions. It is no longer a far-fetched concept 
only seen in science fiction movies. Currently, AI systems offer convenience, have the 
potential to enhance workflows, and are becoming increasingly easy to incorporate into 
everyday activities. There are many potentially positive outcomes when leveraging the 
capabilities of AI systems, regardless of the industry.  
The law enforcement domain in the United States faces many problems that, on 
face value, are excellent applications for AI. In general, law enforcement is facing growing 
amounts of data with few personnel that possess the ability to derive analytical insights 
from data trends. Additionally, many law enforcement agencies strive for data-driven 
polices, especially in areas to enhance their impact to the communities they serve or to 
target specific crimes that plague the community. AI and its ability to derive trends from 
vast datasets provide an opportunity for law enforcement to boost their capabilities and 
overall service to the community. However, if law enforcement is to leverage this 
technology, how can citizens be sure AI will actually be beneficial and used in a just 
manner? This thesis will review current uses of AI systems in the law enforcement domain 
in an effort to assess their overall effectiveness.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Artificial intelligence has the potential to enhance the workflows, productivity, and
effectiveness of individuals and groups that elect to implement the technology. However, 
potential optimization and enhancement carry the risk of repercussions from AI usage. The 
risk from technical issues can emanate from the algorithm’s design, biases from the data 
used to train the algorithm, or policy gaps that do not consider the potential effects of this 
technology.  
2 
The public sector has implemented AI systems before, but they are often embroiled 
in a cloud of controversy due to privacy concerns or legal challenges. This was the case 
with the COMPAS algorithm implemented by the state of Wisconsin that predicted the risk 
of releasing offenders on bail.1 Ultimately, the state of Wisconsin allowed usage of the 
COMPAS algorithm, and the Supreme Court denied an appeal by the plaintiff.2 Aside from 
privacy concerns, other problems include unintended bias against specific populations or 
potentially misleading outputs. If domestic law enforcement agencies intend to incorporate 
this new technology into their workflows, these problems can give rise to widespread 
unintended effects, some negative.  
Some existing system design models identify critical considerations regarding the 
overall process of AI systems, such as algorithmic transparency, which underscores the 
importance of auditability, transparency, and intelligibility, or the discretion continuum 
that models when automated decision making by machine learning algorithms (MLAs) 
would be appropriate.3 These system design models provide a foundation for the 
responsible implementation of AI systems in the law enforcement community. Still, law 
enforcement agencies are generally unwilling or unable to implement this type of new 
technology due to a lack of policy or oversight to manage the associated risks.4  
1 State of Wisconsin v. Eric L. Loomis, No. 2015AP157- CR (Wis. Ct. App. July 13, 2016); Tim 
Brennan, William Dieterich, and Beate Ehret, “Evaluating the Predictive Validity of the COMPAS Risk 
and Needs Assessment System,” Criminal Justice and Behavior 36, no. 1 (October 20, 2008): 21–40, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854808326545. 
2 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Eric L. Loomis, Petitioner v. Wisconsin, No. 16–6387 
(May 2017). 
3 Alexander Babuta, Marion Oswald, and Christine Rinik, Machine Learning Algorithms and Police 
Decision-Making Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Challenges, Whitehall Report 3–18 (London: Royal 
United Services Institute, 2018), 17–22, https://rusi.org/publication/whitehall-reports/machine-learning-
algorithms-and-police-decision-making-legal-ethical; Emily Berman, “A Government of Laws and Not of 
Machines,” Boston University Law Review 98, no. 5 (October 2018): 1333–55; Auditability refers to the 
ability of the system processes to be examined. Transparency references either the policies or general 
availability of a system to be examined by a third party. Intelligibility refers to the ability of an average 
adult to review and understand the processes implemented by an AI system. 
4 Hollywood et al., Addressing Emerging Trends to Support the Future of Criminal Justice, 11. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION
How does law enforcement usage of artificial intelligence systems impact the
communities they serve? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW
New law enforcement technologies generally encounter privacy concerns and
considerations when they are first implemented. Sacca and Zoufal tell us a great deal about 
privacy issues regarding emergent technologies, specifically body-worn cameras (BWCs) 
and closed-circuit television (CCTV).5 For example, Zoufal focuses on the ability to 
mitigate privacy concerns by building privacy protections into the system itself.6 When 
discussing BWCs, Sacca argues the lack of policies and laws are one of the main 
contributing limitations to accountability and transparency with BWCs.7 Even more 
concerning, Sacca discusses a survey conducted by USA Today in which one-third of 
surveyed police agencies did not have policies in place for BWCs.8 Their conclusions 
highlight the same implementation problems facing MLAs and AI within the domestic law 
enforcement community. Mitigation controls and policies need to be implemented in some 
fashion to safeguard privacy as required.  
Researchers and policymakers concur that the inclusion of MLAs and AI into the 
decision process requires the consideration of fairness, accountability, and transparency to 
account for privacy and constitutional concerns appropriately.9 These conversations fall 
typically on one of two ends of a spectrum: Either they are incredibly technical and discuss 
intricacies of specific technical processes, or they are incredibly vague, with generic 
5 Donald R Zoufal, “‘Someone to Watch Over Me?’ Privacy and Governance Strategies for CCTV and 
Emerging Surveillance Technologies” (master’s thesis, Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/4167; Giacomo Sacca, “Not Just Another Piece of Equipment: An 
Analysis for Police Body-Worn Camera Policy Decisions” (master’s thesis, Monterey, CA, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2017), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/56797. 
6 Zoufal, “Somebody to Watch Over Me,” 179. 
7 Sacca, “Not Just Another Piece of Equipment,” 86. 
8 Sacca, 85. 
9 Future of Privacy Forum, The Privacy Expert’s Guide to Artificial Intelligence and Machine 
Learning (Washington, DC: International Association of Privacy Professionals, 2018), 22, https://iapp.org/
media/pdf/resource_center/FPF_Artificial_Intelligence_Digital.pdf. 
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definitions for fairness, accountability, and transparency. Among the former, researchers 
have identified specific problems with certain algorithms and datasets. As an example, 
Lucas Dixon effectively demonstrated unintended bias by an AI systems using a dataset 
from Wikipedia.10 His team quantifies the amount of bias and even provides a technical 
solution to account for this bias.11 However, the process was extremely technical and 
solution is dependent on the user’s ability to understand complex mathematical formulas. 
This type of information is not easily translated into effective policy, nor is it easily 
understood by those outside of the subject matter.  
On the other side of the spectrum, policymakers and advisors, such as Data & 
Society and the Future of Privacy Forum, reference the need for “algorithmic 
accountability,” or privacy framing, using fairness, accountability, and transparency, but 
provide no resources for domestic law enforcement agencies to refer to for further 
guidance.12 Both ends of the spectrum provide excellent points and perspectives of the 
same problem. However, neither takes a proactive step further to provide recommendations 
to reduce bias with this new technology. As a result, few, if any, implementation guidelines 
exist for the domestic law enforcement domain, which is likely a significant contributing 
factor for the slow adoption of this new technology.13  
Researchers commonly ask, “Is a given MLA or AI ethical?” This question is 
extremely valuable and should be considered by domestic law enforcement agencies before 
adopting such technology. Sandvig et al. show multiple ways in which the design and 
application of MLAs and AI can be unethical by highlighting previous failures in the 
private industry regarding face detection in commercial cameras, as well as a thought 
10 Lucas Dixon et al., “Measuring and Mitigating Unintended Bias in Text Classification,” in 
Proceedings of AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (New Orleans, LA, USA: ACM Press, 
2018), 68, http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3278721.3278729. 
11 Dixon et al., “Measuring and Mitigating Unintended Bias in Text Classification.” 
12 Robyn Caplan et al., Algorithmic Accountability: A Primer (Washington, DC: Data & Society 
Research Institute, 2018), 10–11, https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/
Data_Society_Algorithmic_Accountability_Primer_FINAL-4.pdf; Future of Privacy Forum, The Privacy 
Expert’s Guide to Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning, 22. 
13 Hollywood et al., Addressing Emerging Trends to Support the Future of Criminal Justice, 7–8. 
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experiment for a new video surveillance system.14 These findings should caution law 
enforcement about the increased risk of unethical outcomes accompanying the use of this 
technology. Domestic law enforcement needs to ensure specific groups will not be targeted 
because of inadvertently biased AI systems. Ultimately, experts have demonstrated certain 
ways in which the design and application of MLAs and AI can be unethical in their usage. 
However, the big picture concerns how domestic law enforcement agencies can identify 
potential ethical concerns with this technology and how those concerns can be mitigated.  
An important distinction to make when using AI systems concerns what is 
considered ethical versus what is deemed to be legal. There are currently few legal rulings 
on the usage of AI systems. One of the most prominent cases is State of Wisconsin v. 
Loomis, which ruled that AI systems can be used to assist with recidivism indicators, 
provided a disclaimer is used.15 However, at what point does the usage of AI systems 
become an invasion of privacy, especially if done by domestic law enforcement agencies? 
The growing usage of body-worn cameras and facial recognition technology in the 
domestic law enforcement domain offers some insight into public expectations regarding 
new technology, and potentially provide policy recommendations to adopt for AI systems. 
However, these similar yet distinct technologies lack guidance on accountability, fairness 
and, transparency issues that arise from AI systems interpretation of data.  
Perhaps a lack of focus in the United States contributes to these limitations. The 
research into AI systems is relatively new but is primarily focused on the European Union 
(EU), as the EU has implemented the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 
Countries in the EU have either adopted the GDPR or updated their data regulations, such 
as the United Kingdom and the General Data Protection Act of 2018 (GDPA).16 These 
data regulations provide general guidance on how data can be used and when consumers 
must be informed. The GDPA also provides the right for individuals to know what 
14 Christian Sandvig et al., “Can an Algorithm Be Unethical?,” in 65th Annual Meeting of the 
International Communication Association (San Juan, Puerto Rico: ICA, 2015), http://social.cs.uiuc.edu/
papers/pdfs/ICA2015-Sandvig.pdf. 
15 State of Wisconsin v. Eric L. Loomis. 
16 Henry Ashton and Matt Hancock, “Data Protection Act 2018,” § 2018 Chapter 12 (2018), 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/12/contents/enacted/data.htm. 
6 
information the government or organizations maintain on them.17 Specifically relating to 
law enforcement, the GDPA contains requirements to maintain accountability with data 
practices and usages.18 Although provisions and regulations address law enforcement’s 
usage of data, no existing standard assesses how law enforcement can best use MLAs and 
AI to limit bias and achieve fairness, which could harm citizens.19 
The United States of America has no federal data policy regulation comparable to 
the GDPR established by the EU. Some states, such as California, have implemented state-
level data regulations, but they are only applicable to residents within California and 
commercial entities within California state boundaries.20 Until such a policy that 
incorporates law enforcement’s usage of data is agreed upon and established by the federal 
government, regulation of AI systems rests with individual agencies. Due to the lack of 
current case-law or precedent, many agencies will be risk-averse when implementing these 
new technologies.  
D. DEFINITIONS
As previously mentioned, researchers and policymakers agree that AI systems
require considerations of privacy, transparency, accountability. In order to evaluate the 
impact of law enforcement’s usage of AI systems, it is also beneficial to assess the 
effectiveness of the system, equality of individuals before the law, and the underlying 
fairness of the AI system. Throughout this thesis, these five criteria will be used while 
assessing various types of AI systems currently used in the law enforcement domain. To 
provide a common understanding of the identified criteria, they have been defined below.  
17 Ashton and Hancock, 2. 
18 Babuta, Oswald, and Rinik, Machine Learning Algorithms and Police Decision-Making Legal, 
Ethical and Regulatory Challenges, 29. 
19 Babuta, Oswald, and Rinik, 33. 
20 “California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, California Civil Code,” § 1798.100 (2018). 
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1. Effectiveness
A large benefit of AI systems is the ability to be a force multiplier in the workforce. 
In this thesis, effectiveness is defined as the ability of an AI system to positively impact 
the workload of a law enforcement agency. If usage of the system is detrimental to the 
agency or causes difficulties, it would reflect poorly in the effectiveness rating. For 
example, if an AI system is plagued with accuracy issues, it would be evaluated as “low.” 
If studies have shown that an AI system assisted with enhanced performance, it would be 
evaluated as “high.” 
2. Privacy
Americans have a reasonable expectation of privacy, as interpreted by the Fourth 
Amendment. Granted, there are limitations to this expectation, but those limits have not 
been codified in regards to data and AI systems. In this thesis, privacy refers to the 
capabilities of an AI system to “identify, profile, and directly affect” people without their 
knowledge or consent.21 For example, if data regarding law-abiding systems is used by 
law enforcement without the individuals’ consent, privacy would be evaluated as “low.” If 
law-abiding citizens have the ability to opt-out of AI systems that may use their data, then 
privacy would be evaluated as “high.” 
3. Fairness
Fairness within an AI system has been an ongoing debate within the data science 
community because there are many ways to define it, and it can vary in different 
circumstances.22 For the purposes of this thesis, fairness refers to the likelihood of an AI 
system to evaluate an outcome without being impacted by some form of bias. For example, 
an AI system would be considered unfair if it regularly classified black men as more likely 
to commit crimes than white men, given the only difference is race. This example denotes 
21 Michael Deane, “AI and the Future of Privacy,” Medium, September 7, 2018, 
https://towardsdatascience.com/ai-and-the-future-of-privacy-3d5f6552a7c4. 
22 Sahil Verma and Julia Rubin, “Fairness Definitions Explained,” in Proceedings of the International 
Workshop on Software Fairness (ICSE ‘18: 40th International Conference on Software Engineering, 
Gothenburg, Sweden: ACM, 2018), 1–7, https://doi.org/10.1145/3194770.3194776. 
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a racial bias present in the AI system and would be rated “low” in the fairness category. 
An unfair AI system used by law enforcement will have a negative impact on the 
community. If an AI system does not exhibit any bias, it would be evaluated as “high.” 
4. Transparency
David de Ferrani et al. define transparency in “How to Improve Governance: A 
New Framework for Analysis and Action” as “the availability and increased flow to the 
public of time, comprehensive, relevant, high-quality and reliable information concerning 
government activities.”23 Actions that align with this definition are the disclosures of 
budget and policies to the public for review and awareness.24 For the purposes of this 
thesis, this definition equates to the ability of the general public to have access to and 
review any policies governing the usage of AI systems by law enforcement. Transparency 
provides insight into how law enforcement is using technology and informs the public 
regarding its usage. For example, if law enforcement is unwilling to provide information 
regarding their usage of AI systems, transparency would be considered “low.” If 
information regarding an AI system or its policies is publicly available, it would be 
evaluated as “high.” 
5. Accountability
From the same work, Ferranti et al. define accountability as “the responsiveness on 
the part of government to citizens’ demands concerning the type of public services the 
public sector should provide.”25 Regarding law enforcement projects, this equates roles 
such as Inspector Generals or auditors that can review information to ensure systems are 
being used properly. Ideally, the oversight provided by those roles will help determine 
resources are being used effectively to serve the community and ensure compliance with 
any established policies or procedures. This is an extremely important aspect with regards 
to AI systems in the United States because there are no federal regulations on this 
23 David de Ferranti et al., How to Improve Governance: A New Framework for Analysis and Action 
(Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 7. 
24 de Ferranti et al., 7. 
25 de Ferranti et al., 7. 
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technology or a modern data privacy act to ensure information is used in an appropriate 
manner. For example, if law enforcement does not regularly audit the usage of their system 
or if the AI system simply isn’t able to be audited, accountability would be rated as “low.” 
If law enforcement regularly audits user activity within the AI system, accountability 
would be evaluated as “high.” 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN
This thesis will use an inductive case study format as described by Jack Levy, which
aims “to describe, explain, interpret, and/or understand a single case as an end in itself.”26 
Facial recognition, predictive risk assessment, and predictive policing AI systems have 
been identified as specific cases to be studied. Within each type of AI system, at least one 
specific case will be assessed. As previously described and seen throughout the literature 
review, effectiveness, privacy, fairness, transparency, and accountability will be used as 
the primary assessment criteria. These categories are instrumental to the responsible usage 
of AI systems, as they speak to the impact of AI systems in the social and political realms, 
as well as the practicality to law enforcement agencies and legality of the technology.  
The provided criteria will be evaluated primarily using qualitative metrics, as it is 
challenging to ascertain quantitative metrics for topics such as privacy and fairness. 
However, each criterion will be evaluated with a value of “low,” “medium,” or “high,” 
depending on how well that topic is addressed for that category. After analyzing all options 
by the identified criteria, this thesis intends to provide policy option recommendations for 
responsible utilization of MLAs and AI by law enforcement agencies.  
Information to assess these policy options will be acquired through publicly 
available documents and scholarly research into the topic of AI systems. Currently, little 
prescriptive policy work exists in the United States. However, the European Union is 
currently developing policy guidance that will further inform this thesis and potential 
26 Jack S. Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” Conflict Management and 
Peace Science 25, no. 1 (February 2008): 4, https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940701860318. 
10 
policy options.27 Where applicable, this thesis will also use current federal legislation, as 
well as any policies implemented at law enforcement agencies employing this technology. 
Although the subject of AI systems is highly technical in nature, the intent of this thesis is 
not to be technical but to determine the best path for responsible implementation of AI 
technology through policy. Any policy recommendations identified through this process 
should be specific enough to address the defined criteria, but elastic enough that they do 
not become obsolete as the technology evolves.  
Potential challenges with this research design include the ever-changing nature of 
this technology. On a regular basis, new information regarding this technology is made 
available, whether it involves advancements in the technology itself or the creation and/or 
approval of new regulatory measures for the technology. An example of this limitation is 
the growing number of municipalities working towards an outright ban of facial 
recognition systems within their jurisdictional authorities.  
F. THESIS OUTLINE
This chapter demonstrated the need for further research into the provided research
question. As law enforcement agencies incorporate AI systems into their processes, there 
exists a need to examine the impact on the communities they serve. Five criteria have been 
provided and define for the evaluation of three different types of AI systems. Chapter II 
provides a technology overview of many AI systems in use by law enforcement today. The 
overview is not technical in nature, but provides enough information for a general 
understanding of how the technology works. Chapters III through V provide case studies 
and analysis on facial recognition, predictive risk assessment, and predictive policing AI 
systems. Each chapter concludes with an evaluation based on the five defined criteria. 
Chapter VI reviews the analysis of each case study while discussing the generalized impact 
of law enforcement’s usage of AI systems. It concludes with a look at an AI framer 
European Union has developed.  
27 European Commission, On Artificial Intelligence - A European Approach to Excellence and Trust, 
COM(2020) 65 Final (Brussels: European Commission, 2020), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=COM:2020:65:FIN. 
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II. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS
This chapter will provide a brief overview of AI systems currently used by law 
enforcement agencies across the United States. Specifically, this chapter discusses 
automated license plate readers, facial recognition, and predictive analytic AI systems. 
Although technical details are not provided, a brief non-technical overview of the 
technology is given, and a discussion on some of the challenges law enforcement agencies 
may have when utilizing these systems.  
In 2012, the Bureau of Justice Assistance Law Enforcement Forecasting Group 
(LEFG) outlined the benefits for law enforcement agencies to possess an analytic function, 
primarily through intelligence-led policing.28 However, the LEFG identifies potential 
problems law enforcement agencies should prepare for, such as the unprecedented growth 
of available information.29 The LEFG argues this growth of data as reasoning to further 
invest in analytical resources in the law enforcement domain.30 Approximately six years 
later, in 2018, the RAND Corporation worked with the Bureau of Justice Assistance to 
assess the impact technology can have on law enforcement processes.31 A significant 
finding of this assessment involved the challenges of big data and analytics, namely the 
general lack of understanding of new technology in most law enforcement agencies and 
the risks posed by implementing these new technologies. These risks range from accuracy 
issues experienced with AI systems, biases that unfairly impact one group of people over 
another, to due process concerns when using predictive policing. 
As anticipated by the LEFG, law enforcement agencies face a data and technology 
problem, namely large amounts of data with limited expertise in data analytics. To handle 
this influx of available data, law enforcement agencies need to leverage technology to 
28 Law Enforcement Forecasting Group, Increasing Analytic Capacity of State and Local Law 
Enforcement Agencies: Moving Beyond Data Analysis to Create a Vision for Change, 2010-DB-BX-K003 
(Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice, 2012), 5, https://bja.ojp.gov/
sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/Publications/LEFGIncreasingAnalyticCapacity.pdf. 
29 Law Enforcement Forecasting Group, 15. 
30 Law Enforcement Forecasting Group, 15. 
31 Hollywood et al., Addressing Emerging Trends to Support the Future of Criminal Justice, xi. 
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assess their growing datasets. There are many types of technology available to help with 
the influx of data, but this thesis focuses on artificial intelligence (AI) specifically. AI 
encompasses a growing capability that can potentially assist law enforcement with this 
predicament of increasing volumes of information that need to be analyzed; however, there 
are risks that agencies should know. 
A. TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW
In general terms, AI is split into two main categories: Narrow AI and General AI.32
General AI refers to the type of intelligent behavior one would expect from an average 
person in a wide variety of tasks.33 This is typically the type of AI that is portrayed in 
science fiction movies. Most experts agree that General AI will not be achieved for 
decades.34 However, Narrow AI is widely used today in a variety of scenarios and sectors. 
In fact, the digital assistant on your mobile devices such as Siri or Alexa would be 
considered Narrow AI. 
Narrow AI encompasses applications to specific use cases, such as self-driving 
vehicles, facial recognition, or other narrowly defined tasks.35 These problems are 
typically solved through statistical analyses, machine learning algorithms, or rule-based 
logic. Most of the applications in this thesis will encompass machine learning algorithms, 
which can be categorized into supervised machine learning and unsupervised machine 
learning.36 Supervised machine learning generally provides a training data set that contains 
the data itself and the outcome. In supervised machine learning, the desired result is a 
32 National Science and Technology Council, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence 
(Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, 2016), 7, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf. 
33 National Science and Technology Council, 7. 
34 National Science and Technology Council, 7. 
35 National Science and Technology Council, 7. 
36 Field Cady, The Data Science Handbook (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2017), 89. 
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reliable algorithm to estimate the output.37 Unsupervised machine learning only requires 
raw data, and the algorithm is expected to find underlying patterns in the data itself.38  
B. CURRENT USAGE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT
Usage of AI systems by law enforcement is not a foreign concept by any stretch of
the imagination. As of 2020, there are many vendors that offer various types of tools to aid 
law enforcement operations via AI systems. These vendors’ capabilities range from 
enhancing license plate readers, facial recognition systems, and predictive policing 
applications. While these capabilities do not represent the complete potential of AI 
systems, they provide some of the most common and current use cases for law enforcement 
in the United States. 
1. Automated License Plate Readers
Automated license plate readers (ALPR) are currently used throughout the nation 
as a force multiplier by law enforcement agencies. ALPR technology allows law 
enforcement agencies to automate the process of running license plates through specific 
“hotlists” to determine if the vehicle is associated with any alerts, wanted individuals, or 
bulletins.39 This is accomplished through the usage of high-speed cameras that capture 
images of license plates, optical character recognition (OCR) via types of AI systems to 
detect the characters of the license plate, and “hotlists” that contain license plate 
information of interest to law enforcement.40 If the ALPR system is able to identify license 
plates that match the provided “hotlists,” alerts are delivered to officers for confirmation 
and action. This ALPR process vastly improves the investigative capabilities of law 
enforcement by automating the process of detecting vehicles of interest throughout an 
37 Cady, 89. 
38 Cady, 89. 
39 David J Roberts and Meghann Casanova, Automated License Plate Recognition (ALPR) Use by 
Law Enforcement: Policy and Operational Guide, Summary, 239605 (Alexandria, VA: International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, 2012), 1, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/239605.pdf. 
40 Roberts and Casanova, 1–2. 
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officer’s day in a passive manner. No action is required of the officer until a “hotlist” 
vehicle is detected.  
For ALPR systems, AI is used explicitly in the OCR portion of the process. For 
these systems to be successful, image analysis and character recognition need to be fast so 
that information can be shared back to law enforcement in near real-time. Continuous 
improvement of OCR capabilities is achieved by advancing AI systems for faster and more 
reliable detection and character classification.41  
2. Facial Recognition
Facial recognition technology (FRT) has been around longer than many may 
expect. FRT was initially developed in the 1960s by Woodrow Bledsoe.42 This process 
worked by manually recording measurements between facial features, which were later 
stored in databases for easy comparisons to other measurements.43 Since the 1960s, FRT 
has become a biometric identifier, meaning it is an “automatically measurable, robust and 
distinctive physical characteristic or personal trait that can be used to identify an individual 
or verify the claimed identity of an individual.”44 
Currently, FRT is used heavily by law enforcement agencies and is an integral part 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Next Generation Identification program, 
which currently allows law enforcement to submit photos to be searched against over thirty 
million criminal mug shot photos.45 Additionally, some vendors provide FRT access at a 
low barrier to entry when considering cost or technical set up. In the early 2020s, there are 
41 Riel D. Castro-Zunti, Juan Yépez, and Seok-Bum Ko, “License Plate Segmentation and 
Recognition System Using Deep Learning and OpenVINO,” IET Intelligent Transport Systems 14, no. 2 
(February 1, 2020): 125, https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-its.2019.0481. 
42 Divyesh Dharaiya, “History of Facial Recognition Technology and Its Bright Future,” readwrite, 
March 12, 2020, https://readwrite.com/2020/03/12/history-of-facial-recognition-technology-and-its-bright-
future/. 
43 Dharaiya. 
44 John D. Woodward Jr. et al., Biometrics: A Look at Facial Recognition (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2003), 1, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a414520.pdf. 
45 “Next Generation Identification (NGI),” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed September 4, 
2020, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-other-biometrics/ngi. 
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two vendors worth noting, Amazon Web Services and Clearview AI, due to their ease of 
use and potentially controversial nature, which will be discussed in the next section.  
Regarding FRT, AI systems have played a large contributing factor in the rapid 
development and dependability of the FRT over the past ten years. Breakthroughs in AI 
systems technology, such as neural networks, have allowed FRT to become more efficient 
and accurate than before.46  
3. Predictive Analytics
In “A Review on Predictive Analytics in Data Mining,” the authors define 
predictive analytics as a process that utilizes “various techniques from machine learning, 
statistics, data mining, modeling and artificial intelligence for analyzing the current data 
and to make predictions about the future.”47 In the law enforcement domain, predictive 
analytics can be used on “criminal, traffic, and civil (CTC) incident datasets” to predict 
where and when future incidents are most likely to occur based on previously collected 
data.48 
Perhaps the most notable usage of predictive analytics in the criminal justice system 
is the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) 
algorithm. This algorithm is in use by courts to assess an offender’s likelihood to recidivate 
based on “more than 100 factors, including age, sex, and criminal history.”49 Although 
46 Stephen Shankland, “Boosted by AI, Facial Recognition Eases Our Path Through an Increasingly 
Digital World,” CNET, March 28, 2019, https://www.cnet.com/news/huge-leaps-in-ai-have-made-facial-
recognition-smarter-than-your-brain/. 
47 V. Kavya and S. Arumugam, “A Review on Predictive Analytics in Data Mining,” International 
Journal of Chaos, Control, Modelling and Simulation 5, no. 1/2/3 (September 30, 2016): 1, https://doi.org/
10.5121/ijccms.2016.5301. 
48 Abish Malik et al., “Proactive Spatiotemporal Resource Allocation and Predictive Visual Analytics 
for Community Policing and Law Enforcement,” IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer 
Graphics 20, no. 12 (2014): 1863, 1871, https://doi.org/10.1109/TVCG.2014.2346926. 
49 Sam Corbett-Davies et al., “Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness,” in 
Proceedings of the 23rd ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data 
Mining, KDD ‘17 (Halifax, NS, Canada: Association for Computing Machinery, 2017), 1, 10.1145/
3097983.3098095. 
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there is a substantial amount of concern and controversy over the COMPAS algorithm 
usage, the Wisconsin State Supreme Court upheld its use.50 
Predictive analytics is also currently used by law enforcement to help determine 
optimized patrol routes to deter crime. Agencies like the Los Angeles Police Department, 
the New York Police Department, and the Chicago Police Department all have some form 
of predictive analysis to assist with their staffing assignments and strategies.51 This is 
accomplished through AI systems that are either procured, such as PredPol, or developed 
internally with subject matter staff. These AI systems can analyze enormous data sets to 
determine correlations between identified data elements, such as date/time, location, and 
crime type.52 
C. POTENTIAL ISSUES WITH AI SYSTEMS
There are potential issues that law enforcement agencies need to consider before
using any type of AI system. Some of the potential problems that warrant attention are 
potential accuracy, privacy, and constitutional issues. Law enforcement should consider 
these issues because there can be ramifications that impact the agency itself or even the 
individuals subject to these AI systems.  
1. Potential Accuracy Issues
Osonde Osoba and William Welser IV make an excellent argument that “most 
algorithms have only probabilistic guarantees of accuracy” because it is nearly impossible 
to have a perfect dataset or process that can account for nearly every outcome.53 
Inaccuracies in AI systems can come from many places and are not simply limited to the 
algorithm used to derive conclusions. Issues regarding the outcome can also stem from 
50 State of Wisconsin v. Loomis, No. 2015AP157- CR (Wis. Ct. App. July 13, 2016). 
51 Tim Lau, “Predictive Policing Explained,” Brennan Center for Justice, April 1, 2020, 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/predictive-policing-explained. 
52 Lau. 
53 Osonde Osoba and William Welser, An Intelligence in Our Image: The Risks of Bias and Errors in 
Artificial Intelligence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 3–4, https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_reports/RR1744.html. 
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underlying collection procedures, poorly defined algorithms, or an outright over-reliance 
on the AI system itself.54 These accuracy problems can lead to potential bias issues within 
AI systems. The website “Towards Data Science” refers to algorithmic bias as “the lack of 
fairness that emerges from the output of a computer system.”55 
Accuracy and bias can emerge from multiple places within an AI system. When 
trained on a dataset, non-obvious historical biases found in the training dataset may 
continue to enforce those biases.56 Bias can also come from the methodologies used by 
developers writing the software of the AI system. Whether or not it is intentional, software 
developers’ choices can impart bias in the system’s outcomes.57  
These inaccuracies and biases can lead to unfairness by disproportionately affecting 
certain groups of people. As an example that will be explored further, multiple court 
systems have used a predictive risk assessment AI system to evaluate offenders’ likelihood 
to recidivate. Studies have indicated that black offenders are typically assessed at a higher 
risk than white counterparts.58 Accuracy and bias issues can be troublesome if experienced 
while in use by law enforcement agencies, resulting in wrongful arrests of individuals 
based on inaccurate AI system returns. 
2. Potential Privacy Issues
The Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs) are comprised of eight principles 
central to the Privacy Act of 1974 and are central to many laws at the state and federal 
54 Osoba and Welser, 4. 
55 Richmond Alake, “Algorithm Bias In Artificial Intelligence Needs To Be Discussed (And 
Addressed),” Medium, April 28, 2020, https://towardsdatascience.com/algorithm-bias-in-artificial-
intelligence-needs-to-be-discussed-and-addressed-8d369d675a70. 
56 Matthew Guariglia, “Technology Can’t Predict Crime, It Can Only Weaponize Proximity to 
Policing,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, September 3, 2020, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/09/
technology-cant-predict-crime-it-can-only-weaponize-proximity-policing. 
57 Sandvig et al., “Can an Algorithm Be Unethical?,” 2. 
58 Jeff Larson et al., “How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm,” ProPublica, May 23, 
2016, https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm. 
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level.59 These eight principles are transparency, individual participation, purpose 
specification, data minimization, use limitation, data quality and integrity, security, and 
accountability and auditing.60 These principles intend to provide privacy protections to the 
individuals whose data is contained within databases and used by various data systems, 
including AI systems. 
However, Solon Barocas and Helen Nisenbaum make the argument that with the 
introduction of big-data analytics, machine learning, and artificial intelligence, there are 
limitations that can be expected to privacy, especially in terms of consent and anonymity.61 
For example, with enough data, AI systems can infer information about people without 
obtaining consent from the individual for the information. An example used by Barocas 
and Nisenbaum to highlight this point is purchase history at Target. Using enough data, 
Target could infer when women were pregnant based on their purchase history, regardless 
of whether the customer had consented to share that type of information.62 In a similar 
fashion, when only anonymous records are kept, generally, there is enough information to 
identify that individual without relying on personally identifiable information.63 
3. Potential Constitutional Issues
One of the largest constitutional issues to keep in mind with AI systems is due 
process. Due process as described in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution states the 
following: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service 
in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
59 Hugo Teufel III, “Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum,” official memorandum (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, December 29, 2008), 1–2, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/privacy-policy-guidance-memorandum-2008-01.pdf. 
60 Teufel III, 3–4. 
61 Solon Barocas and Helen Nissenbaum, “Big Data’s End Run Around Procedural Privacy 
Protections,” Communications of the ACM 57, no. 11 (November 2014): 31–33, https://doi.org/10.1145/
2668897. 
62 Barocas and Nissenbaum, 32. 
63 Barocas and Nissenbaum, 32–33. 
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offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.64 
Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment references due process in Section One by 
stating, “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”65 Cornell Law School interprets due process outlined in the Constitution 
as limitations put upon the state that must be followed before depriving a citizen of life, 
liberty, or property. Simply put by Cornell Law School, “it is not always enough for the 
government just to act in accordance with whatever law there may happen to be. Citizens 
may also be entitled to have the government observe or offer fair procedures, whether or 
not those procedures have been provided for in the law on the basis of which it is acting.”66 
This interpretation puts the onus on government entities to implement fair procedures 
before taking action that may inhibit a citizen’s life, liberty, or property. How does this 
relate to AI systems? 
In AI systems, there is the concept of “black-box” algorithms. These are algorithms 
where the operations performed on inputs are not directly observable or interpretable by 
the user.67 This process has been compared to using canines to search for narcotics or illicit 
goods. It is unknown how the canine can detect the material, but they are trained to perform 
the task with high accuracy and repeatability.68 However, unlike highly trained canines, 
algorithms do not go through an intense accreditation certification to verify their 
capabilities. This issue of due process relating to AI systems was at the center of the Loomis 
v. Wisconsin (2016) case regarding the usage of the COMPAS algorithm. In this case, the
64 “The Bill of Rights: A Transcription,” National Archives, November 4, 2015, 
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/bill-of-rights-transcript. 
65 “U.S. Const. Amend. XIV,” § 1, accessed September 13, 2020, https://constitution.congress.gov/
browse/amendment-14/. 
66 Peter Strauss, “Due Process,” Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute, accessed September 
13, 2020, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/due_process. 
67 Margaret Rouse, “What Is Black Box AI?,” WhatIs, accessed November 21, 2019, 
https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/black-box-AI. 
68 Emily Berman, “A Government of Laws and Not of Machines,” Boston University Law Review 98, 
no. 5 (October 2018): 1319–20. 
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courts decided other factors were considered to refuse Loomis’ parole, and thus his due 
process rights were not violated.69 However, in Kansas v. Walls (2017), an opposite verdict 
was found. In this case, the courts found the defendant was denied their due process rights 
when the district court refused to provide the full automated assessment that was relied 
upon for determining probation requirements.70 Without the foresight to provide guidance 
on AI systems, there is the real possibility to infringe on protected constitutional rights. 
D. SUMMARY
This chapter provides an overview of different types of AI systems available to law
enforcement and a non-technical review of how these systems work. AI systems are 
commonly found in automatic license plate readers, facial recognition, and predictive 
analytics. When using these systems, some risks should be considered by law enforcement. 
Although this is not an all-encompassing list, there are potential risks regarding the 
system’s accuracy, the privacy of the individuals subject to the system, and the 
constitutional rights of individuals subject to the AI system.  
69 Aleš Završnik, “Criminal Justice, Artificial Intelligence Systems, and Human Rights,” ERA Forum, 




III. CASE STUDY 1: FACIAL RECOGNITION
The first case study addressed in this analysis is the usage of facial recognition 
artificial intelligence systems by law enforcement agencies. As of 2016, it is estimated that 
more than one in four law enforcement agencies have access to facial recognition AI 
systems.71 Deployments of this technology can range from tight integration with other 
services, such as live video streaming, to an outright ban of the technology altogether. In 
fact, with the lack of federal guidance on data protection, privacy, and AI systems in 
general, many local municipalities have made efforts to regulate the technology within 
their jurisdiction. This has been a growing approach from 2018 to 2020, with cities like 
San Francisco, CA, Oakland, CA, Portland, OR, and Boston, MA implementing some form 
of restrictions on the technology, citing the need to protect their constituents’ privacy and 
civil liberties.  
Some cities implementing bans on facial recognition technology also have 
additional sections addressing surveillance technology. The City of San Francisco defines 
surveillance technology as “any software, electronic device, system utilizing an electronic 
device, or similar device used, designed, or primarily intended to collect, retain, process, 
or share audio, electronic, visual, location, thermal, biometric, olfactory, or similar 
information specifically associated with, or capable of being associated with, any 
individual or group.”72 According to this definition, it is reasonable to conclude that AI 
systems, in general, and not those solely limited to facial recognition, will be subject to 
similar policies in these cities.  
This chapter will examine the usage of facial recognition AI systems by law 
enforcement agencies, as well as recent regulations implemented to address growing 
71 Clare Garvie et al., The Perpetual Line-Up: Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America 
(Washington, DC: Center on Privacy and Technology at Georgetown Law, 2019), 25, 
https://www.perpetuallineup.org/. 
72 “Acquisition of Surveillance Technology, San Francisco, CA, Administrative Code,” § 19 (2019), 
sec. 19B.1, https://codelibrary.amlegal.com/codes/san_francisco/latest/sf_admin/0-0-0-47320. 
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concerns regarding the technology. This chapter will conclude with an analysis of five 
criteria: effectiveness, privacy, fairness, transparency, and accountability.  
A. OVERVIEW
Law enforcement agencies currently utilizing facial recognition AI systems
commonly use it in one of four ways: 
1. Stop and Identify. When an individual is unwilling or unable to identify
themselves, the responding officer takes a picture of the individual for
processing in the facial recognition system.73
2. Arrest and Identify. When an individual is arrested, part of the booking
process is the collection of biometric data, such as fingerprints and a
mugshot. In this case, the mugshot is archived in the facial recognition
software to be used for future queries.74 It can also be shared with other
law enforcement agencies for similar purposes, such as the FBI.75
3. Investigate and Identify. If the face of a suspect is available on a piece of
evidence during an investigation, a photo of the face is run through facial
recognition to provide any available leads.76 If there are no matches, the
photo is archived for future use, similar to a mugshot.77
4. Real-time Video Surveillance. If law enforcement is searching for a
specific individual, a “hot list” can be created to search through live video
feeds.78 If a potential match is found, the system alerts users to the
possible match.
73 Garvie et al., The Perpetual Line-Up, 11. 
74 Garvie et al., 11. 
75 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Next Generation Identification (NGI).” 
76 Garvie et al., The Perpetual Line-Up, 11–12. 
77 Garvie et al., 11–12. 
78 Garvie et al., 12. 
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It is difficult to refute the usefulness of this technology for law enforcement, as 
there are many instances where it has provided vital breakthroughs in investigations, 
ranging from credit card fraud, road rage, missing persons, to other violent crimes.79 
However, where there are success stories of the technology, there exist failures as well. 
These failures most often disproportionately affect non-white individuals. As of January 
2021, there have been at least three black men that have been arrested based on bad facial 
recognition matches and have pending litigation on the matter.80  
Currently, four major cities in the United States have established some ban on facial 
recognition. Since there are no federal regulations regarding this technology, each 
municipality decided to regulate this technology within their respective jurisdictions, often 
citing the need to protect their constituents’ privacy and civil liberties. These four cities are 
San Francisco, CA; Oakland, CA; Portland, OR; and Boston, MA. These bans on facial 
recognition technology, sometimes called “face surveillance,” started receiving attention 
in 2019, when San Francisco was the first municipality to ban the technology’s usage by 
any city department.  
The city ordinances used to ban facial recognition technology typically highlight 
multiple concerns regarding the technology. Nearly all cities express concerns regarding 
the potential of unintended bias in the outcome, primarily when law enforcement agencies 
use the technology. The City of Portland explicitly calls out “concerns around privacy, 
intrusiveness, and lack of transparency.”81 
All of these city ordinances preclude usage or ownership of facial recognition 
technology by all city departments, but specifically call out concerns relating to law 
enforcement’s use of the technology. This regulation also extends to information received 
by other agencies, as well. Many law enforcement agencies included under these city 
79 Jon Schuppe, “How Facial Recognition Became a Routine Policing Tool in America,” NBC News, 
May 11, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/how-facial-recognition-became-routine-policing-
tool-america-n1004251. 
80 Kashmir Hill, “Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition Match,” New York 
Times, December 29, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/technology/facial-recognition-
misidentify-jail.html. 
81 “Portland, OR, Ordinance No. 190113” (2020), sec. 1.9. 
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ordinances are prohibited from requesting data retrieved from facial recognition analysis 
performed by other agencies not restricted by these ordinances.  
Despite these restrictions on facial recognition technology, there are some generally 
accepted exceptions to these city ordinances. As more devices begin to leverage some form 
of facial recognition to unlock devices, such as iPhones, city-issued devices used for 
communication purposes are generally allowed to use facial recognition technology. Social 
media providers, such as Facebook, automatically integrate facial recognition into photos 
uploaded to their platform. Although privacy relating to facial recognition is a considerable 
concern for city municipalities, this practice is still allowed. Lastly, facial recognition 
technology can also be used to protect individuals’ privacy by detecting a face and 
redacting or blurring the media.  
B. EXAMPLES
In February 2019, Woodbridge Police Department responded to a shoplifting call
where the suspect attempted to flee after the officers confronted the suspect. While fleeing, 
the suspect left a falsified Tennessee driver’s license and nearly ran over one of the 
officers.82 Woodbridge shared the false photo identification with other law enforcement 
agencies in the area in an attempt to locate the suspect.83 A partner agency utilized facial 
recognition on the photo, which came back to Nijeer Parks, who lived over 30 miles away 
from the incident.84 Despite having a solid, verifiable alibi, Mr. Parks was detained for ten 
days at the local corrections center without bail due to prior convictions.85 In November 
2019, the case was dismissed by the courts, citing a lack of evidence.86  






In May 2019, Michael Oliver was charged with a felony count of larceny after being 
accused of stealing a teacher’s cell phone and destroying the device.87 Facial recognition 
was used to identify Mr. Oliver as a person of interest, and a witness to the incident 
identified Mr. Oliver during a photo lineup.88 It wasn’t until a review of video evidence 
that it became obvious that Mr. Oliver was not involved in the incident, and law 
enforcement dropped the charges in September 2019.89  
In January 2020, law enforcement served a larceny felony warrant to Robert 
Williams in Detroit, MI.90 The main piece of evidence used in his arrest was a facial 
recognition return taken from surveillance video, depicting a similar-looking man stealing 
thousands of dollars of merchandise at a high-end retailer. Mr. Williams was detained for 
over twenty-four hours before being released.91 Despite being released, he still needs to 
go through the expungement process to make sure any record of this arrest is not kept on 
file.92  
These three incidents are potentially the first three cases in which individuals have 
been incorrectly arrested based on the usage of facial recognition technology.93 All three 
individuals from these incidents were black, which highlights additional concerns about 
the technology, its reliability, and any bias that may be present in the system. These 
concerns will be discussed in more depth in the following section of this chapter.  
Despite these incidents and potential issues, facial recognition continues to be used 
by at least one in four law enforcement agencies, as estimated by Georgetown Law Center 
87 Elisha Anderson, “Controversial Detroit Facial Recognition Got Him Arrested for a Crime He 




90 Kashmir Hill, “Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm,” New York Times, June 24, 2020, 
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on Privacy and Technology.94 Currently, it is difficult to determine how useful facial 
recognition is to law enforcement, as metrics that would help address this question are not 
required to be published. There is no doubt facial recognition helps law enforcement with 
identification and investigative purposes, but most agencies using the technology are not 
transparent on the matter. The FBI Facial Analysis, Comparison, and Evaluation (FACE) 
Services Unit is arguably one of the largest facial recognition systems currently in use by 
law enforcement, with access to over 641 million photos comprises driver license photos, 
mug shots, and corrections photos from over twenty participating states.95 From August 
2011 to April 2019, the FACE program received 153,636 probe photos resulting in 390,186 
searches in the system.96  
C. ISSUES
Despite facial recognition’s ability to assist in law enforcement investigations, there
are some serious issues with the technology that are worth considering and can have an 
impact on the overall outcome. Firstly, it is becoming more evident that facial recognition 
is less effective on minority groups of people.97 In December 2019, the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST) published their third study on vendor based facial 
recognition platforms. The first two studies covered performance issues in different types 
of systems, but the third study focused on “accuracy variation across demographic 
groups.”98 NIST found that individuals with a country of origin listed as Africa 
consistently have higher false matching rates within their demographic group. At times, 
94 Garvie et al., The Perpetual Line-Up. 
95 Gretta L. Goodwin, Face Recognition Technology: DOJ and FBI Have Taken Some Actions in 
Response to GAO Recommendations to Ensure Privacy and Accuracy, but Additional Work Remains, 
GAO-19-579T (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2019), 5–6. 
96 Goodwin, 6. 
97 Fabio Bacchini and Ludovica Lorusso, “Race, Again: How Face Recognition Technology 
Reinforces Racial Discrimination,” Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society 17, no. 3 
(August 2019): 331, https://doi.org/10.1108/JICES-05-2018-0050. 
98 Patrick Grother, Mei Ngan, and Kayee Hanaoka, Face Recognition Vendor Test Part 3: 
Demographic Effects, NISTIR 8280 (Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2019), 1, https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8280. 
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this rate was 100 times more than the baseline rate seen throughout the study.99 Although 
not quite as severe, individuals with a country of origin listed as east Asia experienced a 
higher false matching rate, too.100 These findings demonstrate accuracy issues encountered 
with many modern facial recognition systems. Without proper procedures established at 
law enforcement agencies, reliance on these systems can result in erroneous arrests, as 
experienced by the three gentlemen discussed earlier. 
Secondly, there are limited policies and accountability reports available to the 
public regarding law enforcement’s usage of facial recognition technology. In 
Georgetown’s 2016 study on facial recognition, a total of over 100 agencies were surveyed 
for information on how their agency uses facial recognition. Of these responses, 
Georgetown was able to determine of the respondents, 52 agencies have either currently 
using or have used facial recognition in the past.101 Of these agencies, four agencies make 
their usage policies publicly available.102 Only two responding agencies, the San Francisco 
Police Department and Michigan State Police, had accuracy requirements in place for 
procurement.103 Since the Georgetown study’s publication, the city of San Francisco has 
outright banned the usage of facial recognition, including usage for law enforcement. 
Michigan State Police was the only responding agency that provided evidence of routine 
audits on the system to prevent misuse of the technology.104  
Policies and audits regarding this technology provide an essential measure of 
accountability for this technology, mainly because most law enforcement agencies do not 
require formal declarations, such as a warrant, to use the technology.105 In most cases, 
there are no updated privacy laws in place that effectively speak to the recent enhancement 
99 Grother, Ngan, and Hanaoka, 34–41. 
100 Grother, Ngan, and Hanaoka, 34–41. 
101 Garvie et al., The Perpetual Line-Up, 15. 
102 Garvie et al., 51. 
103 Garvie et al., 49. 
104 Garvie et al., 60. 
105 Garvie et al., 37. 
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of technology.106 This point leads to the last issue to be discussed regarding agencies that 
do utilize facial recognition technology: there are few, if any, protections for the individual. 
If there are any protections granted by courts or legislation, they vary by state. California 
is the only state to have passed an updated data privacy act, the California Consumer 
Protection Act (CCPA), and it is only applicable to residents of California. Although this 
legislation does not directly regulate how law enforcement can use data, it does provide 
protections to individuals by requiring the business to inform consumers what data is 
collected on them and how it is used. This is extremely important, as facial recognition 
vendors are using consumer data to create and train facial recognition systems, with the 
intent to sell access to law enforcement customers.  
D. CRITERIA ANALYSIS
Each AI system is evaluated based on five criteria: effectiveness, privacy, fairness,
transparency, and accountability. Each criterion will be provided a score of either low, 
medium, or high and will be determined by constraints, problems, or successes caused by 
each policy that is assessed. Based on each criterion’s outcome, an average score will be 
generated for comparison to the other AI systems.  
1. Effectiveness—Low
Facial recognition has proven to be a useful tool for law enforcement by providing 
investigative leads in cases and identifying individuals quickly. However, there are few, if 
any, policies guiding effective usage of the technology or regular auditing to ensure the 
technology is not abused by users. Since 2019, multiple people have erroneously been 
arrested due to inaccurate facial recognition returns. Additionally, facial recognition 
technology has been shown to be less accurate among certain populations, particularly 
black individuals. Due to these limitations of facial recognition, whether through policy, 
legislation, or accuracy, effectiveness has been evaluated as “low.” 
106 Garvie et al., 43–44. 
29 
2. Privacy—Low
The most considerable privacy concern for law enforcement usage of facial 
recognition technology is the lack of regulations on the technology. These regulations 
could come in the form of agency policies or legislative requirements that define proper 
circumstances for the technology’s use or outline court ordered requirements, such as a 
warrant, before these systems are used. As previously discussed, research has found that, 
generally speaking, facial recognition technology is commonly used by law enforcement 
agencies without any of these regulations.  
As more agencies expand their facial recognition programs to include driver’s 
license and identification photos, additional privacy concerns are warranted. By using these 
photos, it could be argued that a “dragnet biometric database” has been created that not 
only contains criminal actors, but law-abiding citizens as well.107 Due to the lack of 
regulation and the general inclusion of law-abiding citizens’ data, privacy has been 
considered “low.” 
3. Fairness—Low
As previously discussed, studies have demonstrated, facial recognition is not as 
accurate for specific groups of people, namely black individuals, and they are more likely 
to experience false match returns from the facial recognition system. This has led to 
multiple instances where the wrong person was incorrectly identified and subsequently 
arrested. At times, some facial recognition AI systems have seen inaccurate, false match 
rates exceeding 100 times that of the baseline evaluations.108 Although this accuracy issue 
is likely not intentional, it does impact specific demographics disproportionately and could 
be considered an unfair practice if left unchecked. Due to this consideration, fairness has 
been evaluated as “low.” 
107 Garvie et al., 57. 
108 Grother, Ngan, and Hanaoka, Face Recognition Vendor Test Part 3, 1. 
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4. Transparency—Low
In this context, transparency relates to the policies in place for the usage of facial 
recognition at law enforcement agencies. As the Georgetown study shows, very few law 
enforcement agencies have publicly shared any policies or procedures for transparency 
when using facial recognition technology. Without documentation publicly available or 
legislation governing the use of this type of technology, it is nearly impossible for those 
outside the law enforcement agency to know how facial recognition is used. Of the 
responsive agencies surveyed by Georgetown, less than eight percent make their facial 
recognition policy publicly available, and even less had legislative oversight or 
approval.109 Due to these factors, transparency has been evaluated as “low.” 
5. Accountability—Low
Similar to transparency, there are very few agencies with publicly available 
information regarding their attempts to audit their agency’s usage of facial recognition 
systems. Internal audits are an essential component of accountability, as audits are a 
primary driver to ensure systems and processes are not abused or improperly used. 
According to the Georgetown study, ten of the fifty-two responding agencies “indicated 
that they audit their employees’ use of the face recognition system for improper use.”110 
However, only one responsive agency provided evidence that audits are conducted 
regularly to ensure compliance with system use.111 The lack of proper internal audits on 
facial recognition system use is considered a lapse in accountability, which has been 
evaluated as “low.” 
E. SUMMARY
This chapter evaluated the usage of facial recognition AI systems by law
enforcement and some of the challenges with the technology. In its current state, the 
accuracy rates of facial recognition systems impose challenges, especially since accuracy 
109 Garvie et al., The Perpetual Line-Up, 58. 
110 Garvie et al., 60. 
111 Garvie et al., 60. 
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issues tend to impact certain groups of people. This challenge, coupled with the lack of 
regulation at either the agency or legislative levels, leads to unique situations, such as the 
erroneous arrests of individuals due to inaccurate facial recognition returns.  
When evaluated across effectiveness, privacy, fairness, transparency, and 
accountability, the technology is assessed as “low” across the board. Since this is a new 
technology, it is not unreasonable to expect a lag before any reasonable policies or 
legislation are drafted and enacted. However, until such regulations are approved and 
implemented, there are serious concerns regarding law enforcement using and relying on 
this technology. Possible recommendations to help law enforcement successfully 
implement this technology will be discussed in a later chapter.  
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IV. CASE STUDY 2: PREDICTIVE RISK ASSESSMENTS
The second case study examined in this thesis concerns the usage of predictive risk 
assessment AI systems. Predictive risk assessments are the output of a trained AI system 
that evaluates an event’s likelihood. This is a growing field in the medical community as 
there are increasing numbers of AI systems designed to evaluate the likelihood of a 
patient’s diagnosis for certain diseases.  
Predictive risk assessments have also been used by the criminal justice systems 
before to determine the likelihood of an offender to recidivate or how likely an individual 
is to commit a crime. This type of AI system is most often imagined when the law 
enforcement domain intersects with the AI and big data domain. For a good reason, too. 
There have been many science fiction movies and novels regarding this topic, with the 
most prominent being the 2002 film Minority Report with Tom Cruise. In this film, a “pre-
crime” unit prevents major crimes before they are committed with the use of “precogs” that 
can visualize the crime before it happens. In the film, the “pre-crime” used the precogs’ 
abilities to reduce the murder rate to 0 percent, an enviable rate for any law enforcement 
agency or politician.112 
In the case of predictive risk assessments, AI takes the place of the “precogs” from 
Minority Report and leverages historical trends and training from skilled users to evaluate 
subjects. This chapter will evaluate the case of at least one predictive risk assessment that 
has been used by court systems in the United States to evaluate the likelihood of an offender 
to re-offend after placed on parole.  
A. OVERVIEW
Predictive risk AI systems currently find use in many fields, most notably the
medical industry. These systems have enabled doctors to more efficiently diagnose 
diseases and reduce errors. In fact, this has been a promising tool for the medical 
community, with multiple studies indicating greater accuracy than medical professionals. 
112 Minority Report, directed by Steven Spielberg (United States: 20th Century Fox, 2002), DVD. 
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In 2017, multiple AI systems were more accurate than a panel of pathologist experts when 
attempting to diagnose breast cancer.113  
The criminal justice is no stranger to predictive risk assessments either. Plagued by 
increased workload and decreased staffing, courts have sought after tools to help process 
all the data used in the court environment. Predictive risk assessments have been used by 
the courts to help determine the likelihood an offender will re-offend if released. One such 
AI system is the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) developed by the Laura and John Arnold 
Foundation and used by the Kentucky court system.114 Based on specific factors, the PSA 
has three predictive models used to score pre-trial subjects: Failure to Appear, New 
Criminal Activity, and New Violent Criminal Activity.115 
Another predictive risk assessment currently used by the criminal justice system is 
the COMPAS system developed by NorthPointe Inc. This model has garnered more 
attention than most due to an investigative journalism article published by ProPublica. 
Similar to the PSA, COMPAS is an AI system used by the courts to determine the 
likelihood of an offender to re-offend if released on bail. This chapter will dive deeper into 
COMPAS more specifically, but the work done by ProPublica highlights some of the major 
concerns and potential risks of using predictive risk assessments and indicative of present 
discourse on the topic in general. 
B. COMPAS
One of the most prominent implementations of machine learning in the criminal
justice environment has been the utilization of Northpointe’s product named COMPAS. 
This product has been used by Broward County , FL, the State of New York, and the State 
113 Babak Ehteshami Bejnordi et al., “Diagnostic Assessment of Deep Learning Algorithms for 
Detection of Lymph Node Metastases in Women With Breast Cancer,” JAMA 318, no. 22 (December 12, 
2017): 2199–2210, https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2017.14585. 
114 Matthew DeMichele et al., The Public Safety Assessment: A Re-Validation and Assessment of 
Predictive Utility and Differential Prediction by Race and Gender in Kentucky (SSRN Journal, 2018), 2, 
https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3168452. 
115 DeMichele et al., 18. 
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of California.116 Its main function is to assess the likelihood of an offender to re-offend. 
COMPAS generates two primary risk scores, General Recidivism and Violent Recidivism, 
that are both based on “criminogenic factors and historical factors.”117 The COMPAS 
product is widely known due to the legal challenge it faced out of Wisconsin when Eric 
Loomis filed for an appeal on the basis that usage of this algorithm violated his right to due 
process. 
In 2013, Eric Loomis was charged with five criminal offenses related to a drive-by 
shooting in La Crosse, Wisconsin. Loomis eventually pleaded guilty to two of the five 
offenses, and during his sentencing, the Wisconsin Department of Corrections provided a 
presentencing investigation report that included a COMPAS risk assessment.118 As 
mentioned earlier in this paper, the COMPAS is considered to be a black-box algorithm 
due to the nature of the technology and the fact that the source code is proprietary property. 
During Loomis’ hearing, the COMPAS assessment was utilized to sentence him to six 
years of imprisonment and five years of probation.119 
Loomis later filed an appeal with the Wisconsin Supreme Court on the grounds that 
the use of COMPAS at his sentencing “violates a defendant’s right to due process, either 
because the proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents defendants from challenging the 
COMPAS assessment’s scientific validity, or because COMPAS assessments take gender 
into account.”120 The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
arguing two main points. Firstly, the COMPAS information is largely static and based on 
publicly available information about his criminal history. The data’s public availability 
provided Loomis the opportunity to review and challenge the information used by the 
116 Keith Kirkpatrick, “It’s Not the Algorithm, It’s the Data,” Communications of the ACM 60, no. 2 
(January 23, 2017): 21, https://doi.org/10.1145/3022181. 
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algorithm.121 Secondly, the Court concludes that gender usage in the COMPAS algorithm 
promotes accuracy when predicting recidivism rates, which benefits all justice system 
components, including defendants.122 
However, even with this conclusion, the Justices had clarifying comments in their 
response regarding the usage and reliance on risk-based algorithms, such as COMPAS. 
Justice C.J. Roggensack points out the difference between consideration and reliance on 
these assessments, which have very different impacts on the case. Roggensack states, 
“consideration of COMPAS is permissible; reliance on COMPAS for the sentence imposed 
is not permissible.”123 Ultimately, if risk-based algorithms were the only factor considered, 
then the defendant’s due process would have been violated. In an effort to highlight the 
risks of utilizing algorithms similar to COMPAS, Justice Shirley Abrahamson states, “At 
oral argument, the Court repeatedly questioned both the State’s and defendant’s counsel 
about how COMPAS works. Few answers were available.”124 Abrahamson argues that as 
more and potentially better research tools become available, it is important that their 
“relevance, strengths, and weaknesses” are considered by the Court. In addition to being 
upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of the United States denied 
hearing the case, citing “…that determination accords with the sentencing court’s heavy 
emphasis on petitioner’s criminal history and the seriousness of the offense… Petitioner 
would thus be unlikely to benefit from a decision in his favor on the question presented.”125 
Even though the courts do not know exactly how the COMPAS algorithm works, 
it was considered not to violate Loomis’ due process because there was knowledge of the 
data that was used in the algorithm. Some factors, such as gender, are considered to make 
the algorithm more accurate. Although the Courts highlighted the risk of over-dependence 
on COMPAS and similar algorithms, State of Wisconsin v. Loomis provides precedence for 
121 State of Wisconsin v. Loomis at 23. 
122 State of Wisconsin v. Loomis at 35–36. 
123 State of Wisconsin v. Loomis at 53. 
124 State of Wisconsin v. Loomis at 54. 
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using black-box algorithms in Court. Even though there was no satisfactory explanation of 
how COMPAS utilizes data to generate its scores, its usage was still permitted. 
This court case has established precedence on using machine learning algorithms 
and black-box algorithms with no context on how they work. The Court did call for concern 
when utilizing the COMPAS algorithm and others similar to it and prescribed written 
warnings when the algorithm is used. Still, it is doubtful how impactful these warnings will 
actually be.126 Until additional cases are presented in Court, there is the potential for black-
box machine algorithms to assist with the court proceedings and interpretations. If the black 
box algorithm is wholly accurate and can reliably predict recidivism, then this should not 
be a problem. But what if the black-box algorithm is not entirely accurate? 
The COMPAS algorithm was at the center of the Loomis v. Wisconsin trial due to 
its black-box nature. As discussed above, even though there was no explanation of how the 
algorithm works, its usage was still allowed. Presumably, since the algorithm’s use was 
permitted, it should be reasonably accurate. According to documentation from 2009 created 
by Northpoint, the creator of the COMPAS algorithm, there are varying levels of accuracy 
that are considered satisfactory, which are represented by Area Under Curve (AUC) scores 
and represent the likelihood of the model’s accuracy. Scores above .70 are considered to 
have “satisfactory predictive accuracy,” while measures between .70 and .60 are 
considered to have “low to moderate predictive accuracy.”127 In Northpointe’s study, 
researchers found their models generally fell within an AUC range of .70 to .80, performed 
similarly between men and women, and “performed equally well” for white men as African 
American men.128 In 2014, ProPublica, a non-profit investigative newsroom, sought to 
challenge the accuracy of this algorithm. 
ProPublica’s investigation into the COMPAS algorithm covered over 7,000 
individuals arrested during 2013 and 2014 in Broward County, Florida, and followed up in 
126 State of Wisconsin v. Loomis at 29; Harvard Law Review, “State v. Loomis.” 
127 Tim Brennan, William Dieterich, and Beate Ehret, “Evaluating the Predictive Validity of the 
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2015 and 2016 to see if any arrested individuals were arrested again after their release.129 
ProPublica’s investigation found that only 61 percent of the individuals predicted to re-
offend did so within the two years of the investigation, and 20 percent of the individuals 
predicted to recidivate with violent offenses actually did so.130 Their investigation also 
found that black individuals were twice as likely to be falsely identified as likely re-
offenders. In general, white individuals were more often mislabeled as low-risk than black 
individuals, as demonstrated in Figure 1.131 ProPublica’s study found that the COMPAS 
algorithm had an AUC of .636, which means that 63.6 percent of the time, the COMPAS 
algorithm can predict the likelihood of recidivism accurately and is of “low to moderate 
predictive accuracy” per Northpointe’s scale.  
ProPublica’s study pointed out potential flaws in the COMPAS algorithm that 
could point to unintended bias in the outputs. Their research also showed that when 
compared to follow-up data from Broward County, the algorithm was not as accurate as 
claimed by Northpointe. Since this is a black-box algorithm, it would be challenging, if not 
impossible, for defendants to refute the outputs provided by this proprietary machine-
learning algorithm. 
129 Julia Angwin et al., “Machine Bias,” text/html, ProPublica, May 23, 2016, 
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Figure 1. Distribution of scores for white and black individuals evaluated by 
the COMPAS algorithm.132 
C. DUE PROCESS
As noted by John Villasenor and Virginia Foggo, the issue of due process as it
relates to AI systems has not been directly addressed by the courts. Still, case law can help 
shed some light on the impact of AI systems on due process.133 To help facilitate this 
discussion, Villasenor and Foggo focus on four main themes: “Accuracy and admissibility 
of information used at sentencing, access by a defendant to information used at sentencing, 
the scientific validity of AI-based presentencing risk assessment methods, and the extent 
132 Angwin et al. 
133 John Villasenor and Virginia Foggo, “Artificial Intelligence, Due Process, and Criminal 
Sentencing,” Michigan State Law Review, no. 295 (2020): 314. 
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to which such approaches might inadvertently consider impermissible factors such as 
race.”134  
The 1948 Supreme Court ruling in Townsend v. Burke provided the opinion that 
“this prisoner was sentenced on the basis of assumptions concerning his criminal record 
which were materially untrue. Such a result, whether caused by carelessness or design, is 
inconsistent with due process of law, and such a conviction cannot stand.”135 This ruling 
from the Supreme Court presents the concept that defendants have the due process right to 
be tried on material that is not “materially untrue.”136 As pointed out by Villasenor and 
Foggo, multiple court cases throughout the years uphold this finding. However, there are 
plenty of examples where there are insufficient protections regarding “unreliable or 
improperly obtained information at sentencing.”137 When applied to AI systems, how does 
one determine if the information is true or not? There are many factors to consider, from 
data the system was trained with to the AI system’s accuracy. Every component of the AI 
system has the potential to alter the outcome. To complicate the matter, the burden of proof 
is generally left with the defendant.  
The burden of proof can be even more difficult for the defendant when dealing with 
proprietary or “black-box” systems where there is no way for an outside observer to 
determine what happened to the inputs to create the outputs. Villasenor and Foggo argue 
that there is some guidance from existing court cases, even though they are not concerning 
AI systems. In Gardner v. Florida, the Court convicted Garner of first-degree murder and 
sentenced him to death.138 However, the death penalty was based on partial information 
from the presentence trial and not disclosed to Gardner’s council. As a result, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that Gardner’s right to due process was violated by the information’s 
secrecy resulting in the death sentence. Although this seems like a strong stance from the 
134 Villasenor and Foggo, 314. 
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courts, there isn’t clear guidance from the courts on disclosing all facts in a case. In 2006, 
United States v. Baldrich determined that a defendant does not have due process to opinions 
and recommendations.139 From United States v. Eyraud, “[t]o date, no circuit… has 
concluded that the Due Process Clause requires full disclosure of all the information relied 
on by a court at sentencing.”140 This contradicting nature has the potential to be 
troublesome concerning AI systems. 
Villasenor and Foggo posit that the potential secrecy of AI systems is particularly 
concerning. In many cases, AI systems are proprietary to maintain a competitive edge in 
the commercial market. Companies supplying AI systems will not be willing to detail their 
system’s inner workings unless ordered by a court. According to the above-mentioned 
cases, and argued by Villasenor and Foggo, it would be reasonable to expect that all the 
data and process used by AI systems would be subject to due process laws.141  
In terms of scientific validity, Villasenor and Foggo argue that the same 
requirements for expert scientific testimony as outlined in the 1993 case of Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc. should have some applicability to AI systems as 
well.142 In this case, the Court identified four factors to determine whether someone could 
be considered an expert witness. These include “determining whether a theory or technique 
is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact by examining whether it can be and 
has been tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, the known 
or potential rate of error… and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the 
techniques operation, and whether the technique has experience general acceptance within 
the scientific community.”143 Ultimately, this technology is still too new to have 
substantial reporting, peer reviews, and testing to have general acceptance. As a result, AI 
139 Villasenor and Foggo, 326. 
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systems do not meet the core requirements of a human to provide expert scientific 
testimony.144  
Lastly, courts prohibit introducing certain factors such as race, ethnicity, or religion 
to play a factor during sentencing, even if the defendant’s council brings the information 
forward. Villasenor and Foggo claim that this is a concerning element for AI systems, even 
if the system is designed to ignore specific data elements that should be ignored.145 Due 
to the nature of the historical data used to train the AI system, there is a real possibility for 
protected factors could still be implied and used in the courts, even if it is unintentional. 
Villasenor and Foggo use the Iowa Risk Revised (IRR) tool as an example that highlights 
this potential. As part of the IRR tool’s factors, employment status, current convictions, 
and previous convictions are included in this assessment.146 However, these factors have 
been historically impacted by racial discrimination and incidentally include bias based on 
a protected characteristic.  
D. CRITERIA ANALYSIS
Each AI system is evaluated based on five criteria: effectiveness, fairness,
transparency, and accountability. Each criterion will be provided a score of either low, 
medium, or high and will be determined by constraints, problems, or successes caused by 
each policy that is assessed. Based on each criterion’s outcome, an average score will be 
generated for comparison to the other AI systems.  
1. Effectiveness—Low
When used in the real world, the COMPAS algorithm accomplished what it set out 
to do, assist with case evaluation backlog, with moderate success. As is demonstrated by 
ProPublica, the accuracy of the system demonstrates the need to not solely rely on the 
COMPAS algorithm for evaluations. COMPAS was only found to be 61 percent accurate 
when its recidivism predictions were followed up two years after the initial investigation. 
144 Villasenor and Foggo, 328. 
145 Villasenor and Foggo, 332–33. 
146 Villasenor and Foggo, 332–33. 
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This accuracy significantly drops to 20 percent when only considering violent crimes. 
According to the study, the COMPAS algorithm also imparts some bias in its evaluations, 
causing concern in the overall impact on the court system. 
Although these predictive risk assessments provide some insight into the problems 
they are trying to address, they are not completely accurate and are prone to bias in their 
current state. As discussed earlier, COMPAS sees moderate successes in their respective 
domains, but they come with certain risks and caveats that may cause a law enforcement 
agency pause. As a result, effectiveness has been evaluated as “low.” 
2. Privacy—Low
There are serious considerations and potential impacts on privacy when using 
predictive risk assessment AI systems. One of the largest issues is the lack of recent federal 
regulation on data, to the point where individual states feel the need to legislate their own 
data regulations, as was previously discussed. AI systems have the potential to reveal 
protected sets of data by interpreting patterns and connections from other sets of data. Due 
to the lack of regulations in place at the agency or legislative level, privacy has been 
evaluated as “low.” 
3. Fairness—Low
In the COMPAS algorithm reviewed in this chapter, individuals are subject to the 
same processes conducted. However, these processes are subject to previous data sets and 
assumptions that may introduce bias and unfair practices. Despite best efforts, protected 
classes can still manage to find their way into AI systems and disproportionately affect a 
specific subset of individuals. This can happen through training sets of data that contain 
historical racial biases, processes that disproportionately impact a particular group of 
people, or even assumptions made by system administrators or developers that initially 
developed the AI system.147 When investigating the COMPAS algorithm’s accuracy, 
ProPublica found that individuals classified as white were regularly evaluated at a lower 
risk level than their counterparts that were classified as black. ProPublica found that black 
147 Sandvig et al., “Can an Algorithm Be Unethical?” 
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individuals were 45 percent more likely to receive a higher risk score than white 
individuals. Due to the lack of consistency across multiple factors, fairness has been 
evaluated as “low.”  
4. Transparency—Low
As discussed previously, the lack of regulation does not encourage transparency 
within AI systems. When businesses implement proprietary systems without some form of 
regulation, there is no incentive to create transparent systems. These “black-box” systems 
do not allow outside parties to understand the system’s inner workings or provide 
comprehensible explanations to the processes used to transform data.  
Additionally, since private entities own the AI systems discussed in this chapter, 
the owners have no obligation to allow the general public to audit their processes or data 
sources for independent verification purposes. This has severe impacts if these systems 
have a large role in an investigation or trial and significantly complicates, if not makes it 
impossible, for the results to be challenged in a meaningful way. Due to these reasons, 
transparency has been evaluated as “low.” 
5. Accountability—Low
Without regulatory oversight of AI systems, there is no form of accountability when 
incorporated into a law enforcement agency’s usage. There is no way for an agency to 
evaluate or determine the potential impact an AI system like COMPAS would have on an 
individual without some form of impact assessment conducted by the agency. Even though 
AI systems may strip elements of PII, there is still the potential to infer specific people 
from the data correctly. Due to the lack of regulatory oversight when these systems are 
implemented, accountability is evaluated as “low.” 
E. SUMMARY
This chapter evaluated the usage of predictive risk assessment AI systems by the
criminal justice system. Although the examples discussed throughout this chapter focused 
on AI systems used in the courts, many of the concerns are the same if law enforcement 
agencies implemented similar systems. There are significant concerns when using 
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predictive risk assessment tools, especially related to an individual’s right to due process 
and accuracy, as discussed throughout this chapter. As has been seen with other AI systems 
discussed, certain groups of people are disproportionately impacted by the assessments 
made by predictive risk assessment AI systems. Additionally, there are due process 
concerns as these systems can infer traits about a person. Still, it is extremely difficult to 
apply the same standards for verification that are applied to “experts” in the court of law.  
When evaluated across effectiveness, privacy, fairness, transparency, and 
accountability, predictive risk assessments have been evaluated as “low” in every category. 
Similar to facial recognition, this is a new and emerging technology with very few 
regulatory guidelines to help inform and scope its usage by law enforcement. Until such 
regulations are implemented, law enforcement should be wary of using and relying on this 
technology. In a later chapter, potential recommendations for law enforcement will be 
discussed in an effort to ensure an effective approach to this technology. 
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V. CASE STUDY 3: PREDICTIVE POLICING
The third and last case study addressed in this analysis is the usage of predictive 
policing AI systems in the law enforcement domain. Although this is fairly similar to the 
previous chapter on predictive risk assessments, the intent of this case study is to focus on 
the ability of AI systems to derive trends from large sets of data rather than to predict an 
outcome. According to the Atlas of Surveillance, there are over 150 agencies across the 
nation that utilize predictive policing in some form or fashion.148 Law enforcement 
agencies use predictive policing systems to determine staffing and resource allocation, 
areas where crime is likely to occur or to determine where crimes are likely to happen.149 
Although these tools can be useful and potentially address resource concerns about 
the growing amount of data, there are significant privacy concerns relating to the type of 
data collected and the manner in which it is processed. Although this type of AI system has 
yet to garner the same amount of attention as facial recognition, concerns are mounting. In 
September 2020, Santa Cruz, CA became the first city in the United States to ban law 
enforcement’s usage of predictive policing and defined it as “software that is used to 
predict information or trends about crime or criminality in the past or future, including but 
not limited to the characteristics or profile of any person(s) likely to commit a crime, the 
identity of any person(s) likely to commit crime, the locations or frequency of crime, or 
the person(s) impacted by predicted crime.”150  
This chapter will examine the usage of PredPol, a predictive policing AI system 
that identifies “hotspots” based on trends derived from an agency’s records management 
system. This chapter will also examine some of the larger implications of privacy when a 
law enforcement agency uses a predictive policing AI system. Lastly, predictive policing 
148 Electronic Frontier Foundation, “Search the Data - Atlas of Surveillance,” accessed January 10, 
2021, https://atlasofsurveillance.org/search?sort=state_desc&technologies%5B86%5D=on. 
149 Lau, “Predicitve Policing Explained.” 
150 “Surveillance Technology,” Santa Cruz Municipal Code § 9.85 (2020), 2, 
https://www.codepublishing.com/CA/SantaCruz/#!/SantaCruz09/SantaCruz0985.html#9.85. 
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AI systems will be evaluated using the following criteria: effectiveness, privacy, fairness, 
transparency, and accountability.  
A. OVERVIEW
The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) is often credited with being the first
to develop and use predictive policing used to “anticipate gang violence and to support 
real-time crime monitoring.”151 Predictive policing finds its beginnings in the theory that 
crime is predictable, and criminals tend to operate within their comfort zone. A study into 
predictive policing by RAND describes this as a “blended theory,” where criminals and 
victims follow common life patterns, time and location impact criminal activity, and 
criminals make “rational” decisions about committing crimes.152 Using data that speaks to 
these areas, predictive policing is used to predict or forecast where crimes are most likely 
to occur. Currently, there are many vendors that offer predicting policing services. Some 
of the more popular vendors include PredPol, Palantir, and Hunchlab, which offer services 
such as patrol recommendations, mission planning, and performance analytics153 
There are growing concerns about predictive policing AI systems, especially 
regarding privacy expectations for an individual. With the amount of data used in these 
systems, it is within the realm of possibility to identify individuals with basic demographic 
information. The level of insight to an individual’s preferences, beliefs, and daily activities 
also has fourth amendment implications, as protected information becomes unveiled due 
to correlations discovered by predictive policing AI systems.  
B. PREDPOL
The RAND Safety and Justice Program defines predictive policing as “…the
application of analytical techniques- particularly quantitative techniques- to identify likely 
151 Walt L. Perry et al., Predictive Policing: The Role of Crime Forecasting in Law Enforcement 
Operations, RR-233-NIJ (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 4, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/
pubs/research_reports/RR200/RR233/RAND_RR233.pdf. 
152 Perry et al., 3. 
153 “Law Enforcement,” PredPol, accessed November 24, 2020, https://www.predpol.com/law-
enforcement/. 
49 
targets for police intervention and prevent crime or solve past crimes by making statistical 
predictions.”154 Multiple agencies have used this method to reduce crime within their 
particular jurisdictions, particularly by proactively reducing violent crime.155 As 
technology has advanced, these workflows have been augmented by machine learning and 
artificial intelligence and packaged by vendors to sell to other agencies. One such vendor 
that specializes in predictive policing utilizing these techniques is PredPol.  
As described on their website, PredPol is a tool that “identifies where and when 
crime is most likely to occur, enabling you to effectively allocate your resources and 
prevent crime.”156 Using information reported to the participating agency, PredPol 
leverages machine learning and artificial intelligence to anticipate where crime is most 
likely to happen. PredPol uses a proprietary machine-learning algorithm that finds its 
origins in seismology to predict where crime is most likely to happen. This algorithm is 
trained from the participating agency’s historical information and maps the incidents in a 
geographic information system (GIS) display to interact with the data. The driving concept 
behind PredPol is to identify activity “hotspots” to aid law enforcement in personnel 
allocation in a more strategic and thoughtful manner. If the specified “hotspots” are where 
the most crime has historically occurred, then that location is where more officers should 
be patrolling. 
154 Perry et al., Predictive Policing, xiii. 
155 Perry et al., 80. 
156 “PredPol Mission,” PredPol (blog), accessed November 24, 2020, https://www.predpol.com/
about/. 
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Figure 2. Example of PredPol “hotspot.”157 
On the surface, PredPol makes a sound case for predictive policing and can help 
automate personnel assignments to areas that need law enforcement officers the most, as 
identified by the “hotspots” from historical trends. However, according to researchers 
investigating the impact of predictive policing software, the approach used by PredPol may 
be flawed. It can potentially lead to enforcing or exaggerating bias found in the original set 
of data used to identify the “hotspots.” While conducting their analysis, Kristian Lum and 
William Isaac find “that rather than correcting for the apparent biases in the police data, 
the model reinforces these biases. The locations that are flagged for targeted policing are 
those that were, buy our estimates, already over-represented in the historical police 
data.”158 When Lum and Isaac applied the PredPol algorithm to a year’s worth of Oakland 
crime reporting data, they concluded that using a predictive policing algorithm for 
personnel allocation would “result in the disproportionate policing of low-income 
communities and communities of colour.”159 
157 PredPol, “Law Enforcement.” 
158 Kristian Lum and William Isaac, “To Predict and Serve?,” Significance, October 2016, 18. 
159 Lum and Isaac, 18. 
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The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) has been a PredPol customer since 
2011.160 In 2019, the LAPD Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted a review of 
“data-driven policing strategies” at the urging of multiple privacy and civil rights 
advocates, which included LAPD’s usage of PredPol. While reviewing PredPol, the OIG 
found that officers spent “relatively minimal” time in the “hotspots” identified by PredPol. 
While the targeted crime of vehicle-related crimes targeted by PredPol had a decrease of 
approximately 3 percent during the review period, the OIG could not confidently conclude 
the crime reduction was a direct result of the application.161 Too many reporting and data 
collection discrepancies prohibited conclusive results.162 Although the OIG did not 
recommend suspending or terminating the program, they recommend developing a system 
to report the usage and effectiveness of data-driven programs to their governing 
commission and the general public to promote transparency and oversight.163  
C. PRIVACY
The concept of privacy has evolved over the years, both conceptually and in the
courts. In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis spoke to the evolution of a person’s 
rights and how the law has evolved to maintain pace with society’s expectations.164 In 
their work, “The Right to Privacy,” Warren and Brandies recognize the need to codify the 
right of privacy or “the right to be let alone.”165 Their work also outlines the beginnings 
of a conception of informational privacy, or the right to control personal information kept 
in private or shared with others in confidence.166 
160 Mark P Smith, “Review of Selected Los Angeles Police Department Data-Driven Policing 
Strategies” (official memorandum, Los Angeles, CA: Los Angeles Police Department, 2019), 26, 
http://www.lapdpolicecom.lacity.org/031219/BPC_19-0072.pdf. 
161 Smith, “Review of Selected Los Angeles Police Department Data-Driven Policing Strategies.” 
162 Smith, 28–30. 
163 Smith, “Review of Selected Los Angeles Police Department Data-Driven Policing Strategies.” 
164 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review IV, no. 5 
(December 15, 1890): 193. 
165 Warren and Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy.” 
166 Karl Manheim and Lyric Kaplan, “Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy,” Yale 
Journal of Law and Technology 21, no. 106 (December 13, 2019): 118. 
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In a day and age when data is thought to be more valuable than oil, informational 
privacy becomes increasingly important to the person.167 Not because of the potential 
value they may be missing from the sale of their data, but because of the information, 
trends, and insights that can be extracted from mining this set of data. The argument has 
been made that without regulation, AI systems can undermine privacy values due to the 
sheer amount of data available on a person and connections that can be inferred between 
sets of data.168 In fact, just simple demographic data, it has been shown that approximately 
87 percent of the population in the United States can be uniquely identified by their five-
digit zip code, gender, and date of birth.169 About half of the United States population can 
be identified by place (city/town), gender, and date of birth.170  
Another point of concern regarding privacy issues is the United States has not 
passed any wholesale data regulations since the 1974 Privacy Act, which regulates what 
type of information government entities can store on U.S. citizens.171 There have been 
other acts approved by Congress, such as the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA), Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and the Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act. Still, they are limited in scope and only apply to a small subset of 
the American population. Interestingly enough, individual states, such as California, New 
York, Maryland, Massachusetts, Hawaii, and North Dakota, have taken data rights into 
their own hands by approving their own data privacy laws.172 
Without some form of privacy regulations on AI systems, there is the potential for 
industries, such as the health or law enforcement sectors, to over-reach to the detriment of 
167 “The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data,” Economist, May 6, 2017, 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-
data; Kiran Bhageshpur, “Data Is the New Oil -- and That’s a Good Thing,” Forbes, November 15, 2019, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/11/15/data-is-the-new-oil-and-thats-a-good-thing/. 
168 Manheim and Kaplan, “Artificial Intelligence.” 
169 Latanya Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely, Data Privacy Working 
Paper 3 (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University, 2000), 2. 
170 Sweeney, 2. 




the general populace. Manheim and Kaplan explain, “the aggregation and coordination of 
disparate databases can reveal everything from buying habits to health status to religious, 
social and political preferences.”173 This closely resembles Justice Sotomayor’s opinion 
in United States v. Jones that revolves around “mosaic theory.” In this case, the Court 
sought to determine if GPS surveillance of a vehicle over twenty-eight days constituted 
enough surveillance to trigger Fourth Amendment protections. Ultimately, this case would 
allow for a new approach for Fourth Amendment protections. Prior to this case, Fourth 
Amendment considerations were made step by step. However, by accepting the concept of 
the “mosaic theory,” the courts allow a more holistic approach to determine Fourth 
Amendment protections. Justice Sotomayor states, “I would ask whether people reasonably 
expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the 
Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual 
habits, and so on.”174 Although this case was explicitly geared toward GPS surveillance, 
the concept of “mosaic theory” should apply to AI systems. Ostensibly, this technology, 
through the connections and associations it is capable of, resembles the “mosaic theory” 
described by Justice Sotomayor. 
D. CRITERIA ANALYSIS
Each AI system is evaluated based on five criteria: effectiveness, fairness,
transparency, and accountability. Each criterion will be provided a score of either low, 
medium, or high and will be determined by constraints, problems, or successes caused by 
each policy that is assessed. Based on each criterion’s outcome, an average score will be 
generated for comparison to the other AI systems.  
1. Effectiveness—Low
So far, it has been difficult to gauge the effectiveness of predictive policing AI 
systems. As discussed previously, LAPD determined their experience with PredPol was 
not significant, and it was difficult to discern if the success could genuinely be attributed 
173 Manheim and Kaplan, “Artificial Intelligence,” 121. 
174 Orin S Kerr, “The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment,” Michigan Law Review 111, no. 3 
(December 2012): 238. 
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to the AI system itself. In fact, most of the dosage time detected by PredPol was from areas 
close to areas frequented by officers, such as LAPD facilities, or were driven through in 
response to other calls.175 A decrease of 3 percent isn’t significant, especially when 
accompanied by a 41 percent increase in dosage time, or recommending staffing levels.176 
Although predictive policing AI systems provide some insight into the problems 
they are trying to address, they are not completely accurate and are prone to bias in their 
current state. PredPol saw moderate success in their domain, but the usage of the system 
comes with certain risks and caveats that may cause a law enforcement agency pause. As 
a result, effectiveness has been evaluated as “low.” 
2. Privacy—Low
There are serious considerations and potential impacts on privacy when using AI 
systems. One of the largest issues is the lack of recent federal regulation on data, to the 
point where individual states feel the need to legislate their own data regulations. AI 
systems have the potential to reveal protected sets of data by interpreting patterns and 
connections from other sets of data. Even when PII is stripped from these datasets, there is 
still a good likelihood that an AI system can accurately identify a person with a handful of 
data elements.  
The ability to identify a person without using PII combined with the “mosaic 
theory” presents significant privacy concerns regarding the usage of AI systems. This 
capability offers a situation where AI systems, and their subsequent users (i.e., law 
enforcement officers), to peer into the lives of individuals at will. Of course, this ability 
assumes there is enough data for these connections to be made. Still, in the current 
environment where “data is the new oil,” there is certainly enough information readily 
available for some links to be made. With the evolving understanding of privacy over the 
past 200 years, the ability to intrude upon an individual’s life using information they 
thought was private could potentially violate Fourth Amendment protections provided by 
175 Smith, “Review of Selected Los Angeles Police Department Data-Driven Policing Strategies,” 28–
29. 
176 Smith, 27. 
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the Constitution. With these considerations in mind, privacy was evaluated as “low” 
because there are too many privacy concerns and potential constitutional violations caused 
by this technology’s lack of regulation.  
3. Fairness—Low
In the PredPol predictive policing AI system reviewed in this chapter, individuals 
are subject to the same processes conducted. However, these processes are subject to 
previous data sets and assumptions that may introduce bias and unfair practices. When 
Lum and Isaac reviewed the PredPol system, it was found that “black people would be 
targeted by predictive policing at roughly twice the rate of whites. Individuals classified as 
a race other than white or black would receive targeted policing at a rate 1.5 times that of 
whites.”177 Although not intentional, historical biases found in the data caused an unfair 
application of law enforcement presence.  
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) provides a simple take on this issue 
stating, “Predictive policing is a self-fulfilling prophecy.”178 By this, the EFF is 
highlighting concerns regarding bias found within datasets used to train the AI system that 
will ultimately provide policing recommendations. If police units perform a lot of 
enforcement in a particular area, that area is very likely to remain a recommendation for 
police enforcement due to historical trends. This has the potential to reinforce bias within 
the predictive policing AI system and unduly target members of protected classes. The AI 
system has become unfair to those individuals based on their race. Due to the lack of 
consistency across multiple factors, fairness has been evaluated as “low.”  
4. Transparency—Low
As discussed previously, the lack of regulation does not encourage transparency 
within AI systems. When businesses implement proprietary systems without some form of 
regulation, there is no incentive to create transparent systems. These “black-box” systems 
177 Lum and Isaac, “To Predict and Serve?,” 18. 
178 Guariglia, “Technology Can’t Predict Crime, It Can Only Weaponize Proximity to Policing.” 
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do not allow outside parties to understand the system’s inner workings or provide 
comprehensible explanations to the processes used to transform data.  
Additionally, since private entities own the AI systems discussed in this chapter, 
the owners have no obligation to allow the general public to audit their processes or data 
sources for independent verification purposes. This has severe impacts if these systems 
have a large role in an investigation or trial and significantly complicates, if not makes it 
impossible, for the results to be challenged in a meaningful way. Due to these reasons, 
transparency has been evaluated as “low.” 
5. Accountability—Low
Without regulatory oversight of AI systems, there is no form of accountability when 
incorporated into a law enforcement agency’s usage. There is no way for an agency to 
evaluate or determine the potential impact an AI system like PredPol would have on an 
individual without some form of impact assessment conducted by the agency. Even though 
AI systems may strip elements of PII, there is still the potential to infer specific people 
from the data correctly. Due to the lack of regulatory oversight when these systems are 
implemented, accountability is evaluated as “low.” 
E. SUMMARY
This chapter evaluated the usage of predictive policing AI systems by law
enforcement and many of the challenges associated with these systems, especially 
regarding privacy and applicability. Even when PII elements are removed from large 
datasets, there still exists the potential for these systems to accurately associate activities 
to specific individuals. Additionally, these systems require additional Fourth Amendment 
considerations, as the “mosaic theory” from United States v. Jones should be applicable 
when these systems are in use, which would impact how and when warrants are required. 
As documented by LAPD, it was also difficult to determine the impact similar systems 
have on the agency’s ability to reduce motor vehicle crimes. 
When evaluated across effectiveness, privacy, fairness, transparency, and 
accountability, predictive policing AI systems were rated “low.” This outcome is extremely 
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similar to the other two AI systems that were evaluated. Predictive policing AI systems 
suffer from many of the same problems, such as a lack of regulation at any level to inform 
how and when these systems should be used. In a later chapter, potential recommendations 
for law enforcement will be discussed in an effort to ensure an effective approach to this 
technology.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Like many other industries, law enforcement strives to enhance their performance 
and optimize their workflows to better serve their constituents. As anticipated by the Law 
Enforcement Forecasting Group, the influx of data requires law enforcement agencies to 
adapt to these new challenges.179 Advances in technology allow AI systems to become 
both more powerful and easier to procure. When law enforcement acquires these systems, 
however, there are serious considerations to be aware of because there can be serious 
ramifications if not addressed.  
Three different AI systems were evaluated by five categories that represent 
considerations that need to be taken before law enforcement implement an AI system in 
their agency. These categories cover topics that range from the overall effectiveness of the 
system, how AI systems can affect those subjected to it, and even potential legal issues that 
may arise from using an AI system. These five considerations were evaluated for three 
different types of AI systems: facial recognition, predictive risk assessments, and predictive 
policing.  
Since this is an emerging technology, aspects of AI systems are changing on a 
regular basis, as well as how local, state, and federal governments are reacting to the 
technology’s potential and pitfalls. Limitations regarding available information for this 
study will be discussed in this chapter. 
Lastly, this is not a problem that solely affects the United States of America. The 
European Union (EU) is encountering many of the same problems with AI systems. In 
conjunction with data privacy regulations established, such as the General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), the EU has formed expert groups to evaluate and generate a potential 
framework to establish responsible practices for AI systems.180 The lessons learned from 
179 Law Enforcement Forecasting Group, Increasing Analytic Capacity of State and Local Law 
Enforcement Agencies, 5. 
180 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI: High-
Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence,” European Commission, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
single-market/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai. 
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this expert group are directly applicable to the United States and should be considered as a 
framework to be established by professionals here as well.  
A. FINDINGS
When evaluated by their effectiveness, privacy, fairness, transparency, and
accountability, all AI systems discussed throughout this analysis were rated low for each 
category. Although facial recognition, predictive risk assessment, and predictive policing 
AI systems accomplish different tasks for law enforcement and provide different outputs, 
they all experience many of the same problems.  
1. Effectiveness
The effectiveness of all systems comes into question for two primary reasons: the 
accuracy of the AI system and the impact it has on law enforcement. As seen by facial 
recognition and predictive risk assessment AI systems, accuracy plays a large role in the 
impact of effectiveness.181 If an AI system is inaccurate in its assessments, incorrectly 
identified, innocent people can become suspects in a crime they did not commit.182 
Inaccurate assessments can lead to harsher penalties imposed on people that are not as 
much of a risk as estimated by the AI system. The accuracy of an AI system can also have 
an impact on the fairness of a system, as discussed below. If an AI system unfairly impacts 
a specific group of people, it cannot be considered an effective or useful tool for law 
enforcement. 
Additionally, as was demonstrated by LAPD’s internal audit of PredPol, the impact 
of some of these systems is questionable.183 An effective AI system should be able to 
provide a tangible increase in productivity while either maintaining or lowering the 
required human capital for the project.  
181 Grother, Ngan, and Hanaoka, Face Recognition Vendor Test Part 3, 34–41. 
182 Hill, “Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition Match”; Anderson, 
“Controversial Detroit Facial Recognition Got Him Arrested for a Crime He Didn’t Commit”; Hill, 
“Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm.” 
183 Smith, “Review of Selected Los Angeles Police Department Data-Driven Policing Strategies.” 
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2. Privacy
Each AI system poses a negative impact on privacy for the individual at multiple 
levels. Depending on how it is applied, facial recognition AI systems can essentially create 
“dragnet biometric databases” that impact both criminal and law-abiding citizens. If 
applied in a live video feed, then any expectations of privacy or anonymity in public are 
essentially eroded by the capabilities of a facial recognition system. Since there are no 
current limitations or regulations imposed on this type of technology, law enforcement 
agencies are not required to submit warrants or justification before usage. For this reason, 
many municipalities have taken it upon themselves by banning the usage of facial 
recognition by public agencies within their jurisdiction. 
Facial recognition AI systems are not the only systems with privacy issues. Both 
predictive risk assessment and predictive policing AI systems have the ability to chip away 
at privacy expectations and alter Fourth Amendment expectations. As described by Justice 
Sotomayer, the “mosaic theory” could be applied to AI systems in a similar manner to GPS 
surveillance, as the power of data has grown to the point where intimate details of a 
person’s habits and preferences can be accurately inferred.184  
3. Fairness
Each type of AI system assessed experienced problems with fairness for various 
reasons. Facial recognition AI systems tend to experience much higher false-positive 
matching rates for black individuals than other races.185 Predictive risk assessments, such 
as the COMPAS algorithm, tend to evaluate minority races as a higher risk of recidivism 
than white individuals, even when almost all traits are the same.186 Predictive policing AI 
systems have the potential to reinforce historical trends in data, which has been found to 
184 Kerr, “The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment.” 
185 Grother, Ngan, and Hanaoka, Face Recognition Vendor Test Part 3, 34–41. 
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affect minority communities more than white communities.187 One of the biggest concerns 
expressed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation regarding AI systems is the risk of 
repeating or exacerbating previous mistakes found in historical datasets.188 Put succinctly, 
“Predictive policing is a self-fulling prophecy.”189 While this sentiment was expressed 
specifically towards predictive policing systems, it is applicable to facial recognition and 
predictive risk assessment AI systems, too. Historical biases found in datasets used to train 
AI systems have the potential to reinforce those biases.  
With these biases found in AI systems, it is obvious they impact certain groups of 
individuals more than others. If law enforcement were to rely on these systems in their 
current state with no guiding policy or legislation, there is little oversight to ensure these 
systems are used in a fair manner. In fact, since 2019, there have been three black men 
arrested due to unfair and inaccurate returns from facial recognition systems.190 
4. Transparency
One of the major roadblocks prohibiting transparency with most AI systems is the 
notion of the “black-box” environment. The “black-box” environment does not allow 
outside parties to understand how the system works. This lack of understanding is generally 
accomplished through proprietary claims from vendors or an inability to explain how an 
AI system generated results in a manner that is easily understood.191 Without sharing how 
an AI system works, there is little room for transparency. To make matters worse, if used 
by law enforcement, there can be difficulties explaining how conclusions were made when 
relying on “black-box” systems. 
187 Lum and Isaac, “To Predict and Serve?” 
188 Guariglia, “Technology Can’t Predict Crime, It Can Only Weaponize Proximity to Policing.” 
189 Guariglia. 
190 Hill, “Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition Match”; Hill, “Wrongfully 
Accused by an Algorithm”; Anderson, “Controversial Detroit Facial Recognition Got Him Arrested for a 
Crime He Didn’t Commit.” 
191 Margaret Rouse, “What Is Black Box AI?,” WhatIs, accessed November 21, 2019, 
https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/black-box-AI. 
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When surveyed, very few law enforcement agencies were able to supply publicly 
available policies regarding AI systems in place at their agency.192 Even few law 
enforcement agencies had legislative oversight on the technology. Without any oversight 
or information available to the public regarding AI systems, it is difficult to ensure this 
technology is used correctly by law enforcement.  
5. Accountability
The lack of policies or regulations on AI systems also has an impact on 
accountability. In the Georgetown study, ten of the fifty-two respondents claimed to audit 
employees’ usage of AI systems.193 However, only one of the ten agencies supplied 
evidence that these audits are genuinely conducted on a regular basis.194 In an Office of 
the Inspector General report from LAPD, investigators had a difficult time determining the 
effectiveness of PredPol due to incomplete or inaccurate system records, which calls into 
question how accurate some systems are at capturing user activity.195 
Many law enforcement agencies are not required to submit any formal declarations 
prior to utilizing AI systems, such as warrants or court orders.196 Since many of these 
systems contain information on law-abiding citizens and have the ability to make accurate 
inferences on those subjected to these systems, it is extremely important to ensure actions 
within the system are well documented and maintained. Documenting and maintaining 
actions within the system provides a deeper level of accountability, so long as audits are 
regularly conducted to ensure there is no misuse of the system.  
B. LIMITATIONS
Although this study has shown there are significant concerns with law enforcement
usage of AI systems, there are limitations that warrant consideration. Firstly, AI systems 
192 Garvie et al., The Perpetual Line-Up, 51. 
193 Garvie et al., 60. 
194 Garvie et al., 60. 
195 Smith, “Review of Selected Los Angeles Police Department Data-Driven Policing Strategies.” 
196 Garvie et al., The Perpetual Line-Up, 36. 
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are a relatively new technology to the public sector, including law enforcement. Not only 
does it take time for iterations of technology to make it to law enforcement, but it also takes 
even more time to develop, draft, and institute an effective policy that can guide how this 
technology is used. Although many considerations, such as transparency and 
accountability, stem from policy and regulatory issues, these concerns may be addressed 
in the near future as policymakers become familiar with the technology. There may also be 
law enforcement agencies that have effective policies in place that address these issues as 
well. This assessment is not targeted towards any specific law enforcement agencies. 
Rather, the focus is on general issues caused by AI systems within the law enforcement 
domain. However, conclusions based on this information may quickly become obsolete if 
agencies draft and implement policy that addresses many of the identified concerns 
Secondly, AI systems used by law enforcement can have a significant impact on 
their operations and efforts to combat crime and terrorism. It is reasonable to expect a lack 
of responsiveness to inquiries from researchers that may compromise investigative 
techniques. As such, the assessments throughout this analysis are based on information that 
has been shared with the public and research institutions. This can have an impact on how 
widespread the usage of AI systems within the law enforcement community and how 
impactful these systems are, for better or worse. Unfortunately, this also reinforces 
transparency issues regarding law enforcement’s usage of this technology. 
Lastly, the general tone held by the public regarding the usage of AI systems by 
law enforcement has been more negative throughout the duration of time while research 
was conducted. Perhaps this is due to the lack of transparency, audits, and effectiveness 
studies from the law enforcement perspective available for public consumption. There are 
many anecdotal stories alluding to the usefulness and positive impact had by facial 
recognition, predictive risk assessment, and predictive policing AI systems. However, there 
are few, if any, studies demonstrating the positive impact AI systems can have on law 
enforcement operations.  
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C. EXAMPLES FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION
The European Union, through the European Commission and the High-Level Expert
Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG), has established a framework that outlines ethical 
principles, baseline requirements, and assessment methodologies for the implementation of 
trustworthy AI in the European Union.197 According to the AI HLEG, trustworthy AI 
complies with all laws and regulations, adheres to ethical principles, and should be robust 
from a technical and social perspective.198 Although the guidelines developed by AI HLEG 
are intended to be broad enough to span across multiple industries, such as private 
organizations, research facilities, medical institutions, and government entities, they provide 
baseline requirements to facilitate the responsible implementation of AI.199 Specific 
considerations may be required for homeland security applications, but the AI HLEG 
guidelines offer the most robust case for this technology.  
The AI HLEG utilizes international human rights law, the EU Treaties, and the EU 
Charter to provide the “foundation” of implementing trustworthy AI in the European 
Union.200 Since these fundamental rights, such as protection of personal data and respect for 
private and family life, are guaranteed by law in EU member states, not only is it important to 
ensure AI does not violate these rights, but it is also important to determine certain 
circumstances when they are not applicable, such as specific use-cases within the law 
enforcement or counterterrorism domain.201 Regardless, AI HLEG argues it is vital for AI 
systems to adhere to “the ethical principles of respect for human autonomy, prevention of 
harm, fairness, and explicability.”202 Without these ethical principles in place, AI systems 
potentially pose substantial risks to individuals and groups that can be difficult to anticipate. 
Such risks, especially in the law enforcement and homeland security domain, include 
infringement on individual liberty, privacy issues, and unfair bias, which can lead to 
197 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, “Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI,” 2–3. 
198 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 2. 
199 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 5–6. 
200 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 9. 
201 “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ 326/391, 26.10.2012” (2012). 
202 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI, 13. 
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discriminatory actions or violations of privacy expectations by derivations from large sets of 
data.  
To achieve the aforementioned ethical principles, AI HLEG recommends the 
following seven requirements to be implemented into the AI system’s life cycle: 
Human Agency and Oversight—The requirement of human agency and oversight 
provides the need to ensure fundamental rights provided by the EU Charters and Treaties are 
not violated by AI systems. The AI HLEG proposes this can be accomplished by proper 
training and tools for users of the AI system to comprehend, interact, and challenge the AI 
system.203 Human oversight is another mechanism that allows human intervention at nearly 
every “decision cycle” of the AI system.204  
Technical Robustness and Safety—Technical robustness and safety provide the 
requirement that AI systems be developed in a manner that protects against vulnerabilities to 
the system itself or the data within.205 Technical robustness also speaks to the need to develop 
systems that are accurate, reliable, and reproducible.206  
Privacy and Data Governance—Data quality is extremely important in an AI system, 
encompassing data integrity, and privacy protection. Due to the nature of AI systems, there is 
the potential to accurately infer sensitive portions of an individual’s life, such as religious 
views or sexual orientation.207 If data is not adequately governed, data quality can suffer or 
be maliciously manipulated, leading to potentially harmful bias in the AI system output.208 
Transparency—Transparency is the process in which an external party to the process 
can understand how the AI system provided results. This incorporates the concept of 
traceability, in which the processes used by the AI system can be mapped out, as well as 
203 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 15–16. 
204 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 16. 
205 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 16. 
206 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 16–17. 
207 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 17. 
208 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 17. 
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explainability, where the decisions made by the AI system can be explained in a format easily 
understood by humans.209  
Diversity, Non-Discrimination, and Fairness—Closely related to privacy and data 
governance, AI systems should avoid biased datasets, which can originate from “historic bias, 
incompleteness, and bad governance models.”210 Biases can also originate from the 
programming within the system, regardless of the data used in the model.211 
Societal and Environmental Well-being—When developing an AI system, it should 
be developed and implemented in a manner that does not negatively contribute to the 
environment or maliciously impact societal expectations.212 Special considerations should be 
made for the political environment in which it is implemented, as not to undermine established 
processes or democratic values.213 
Accountability—Accountability encompasses requirements to enable independent 
review of processes in the AI system via audits and impact assessments to determine any risks 
that may occur while using the system.214 Auditability and impact assessments allow the AI 
system to be verified, confirming it is working correctly while allowing system owners to 
accept or mitigate any risk associated with the system.215  
A potential recommendation is for a specialty agency or committee, similar to the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), to develop a framework for AI system 
implementation. Organizations like NIST are well-positioned to provide this framework, as 
they are generally a coordinated effort between subject matter expertise in a particular domain. 
NIST was founded in 1901 and is a part of the U.S. Department of Commerce. NIST is 
responsible for technological standards and research studies in use today, such as the NIST 
209 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 17. 
210 High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, 18. 
211 Sandvig et al., “Can an Algorithm Be Unethical?” 
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Cybersecurity Framework and reference materials for forensic science. A commission like 
this would also emulate the EU model by creating a panel of experts similar to the AI HLEG. 
These experts will be in the best position to develop the framework needed to preserve the 
seven main requirements outlined by the AI HLEG. Once developed, this framework would 
outline implementation requirements for AI systems that can then be shared with agencies 
that may not have resources to create appropriate policies for this technology.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Based on the results and limitations of this analysis, there are several avenues for
additional research on the topic of AI systems usage in the law enforcement domain. One of 
the most crucial recommendations for research would be additional work in the policy and 
legislative arena. If law enforcement is to continue to use AI systems and desire to do so in a 
responsible manner, then there need to be usable policy recommendations drafted that enable 
law enforcement to use AI systems but also protect the privacy and constitutional rights of the 
general public. Finding the balance between law enforcement usage and protection of the 
individual will take additional research through privacy advocate groups, such as the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation and law enforcement advocacy groups. Additionally, new 
details and capabilities regarding this technology are discovered on a regular basis. It is an 
ever-growing capability that will greatly benefit from sound, fungible policy 
recommendations.  
Research into the effectiveness of AI systems in law enforcement practices will 
greatly enhance this discussion, as well. Currently, research into this topic is limited, but this 
research would greatly inform policymakers, as well as law enforcement leaders, about the 
pros and cons regarding the potential impact this technology may have on their agency. 
Research like this would likely be difficult, as it would require participation from law 
enforcement agencies currently utilizing AI systems and potentially their vendors.  
Lastly, any one of the criteria used throughout this analysis warrants additional 
research. This thesis served as a look into potential problems that need to be considered for 
law enforcement agencies to responsibly use AI systems, but there are additional implications 
for each of the five categories that can be discussed in greater detail. As alluded to earlier, 
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since this topic is new and constantly evolving, there will likely be changes that require a 
reassessment of the five categories. 
E. CONCLUSIONS
Several conclusions can be made regarding this analysis of AI systems in the law
enforcement domain. The first conclusion is that many types of AI systems have the potential 
to disproportionately affect certain communities of people. Regardless of the AI system 
evaluated throughout this analysis, black people were consistently impacted the most. This 
manifested in poor accuracy in AI systems as well as historical trends embedded in datasets 
used to train AI systems. Regardless of why certain communities are impacted more, law 
enforcement should not solely trust the outputs of these systems, or they will risk unfair 
actions against the community they serve. 
The second conclusion from this study is there exists a lack in the regulation of this 
type of technology within the law enforcement community. Regulation exists in the form of 
policies governing use, legislation provided by a governing body, or any kind of regular 
auditing of system usage. The creation and enforcement of these regulations will greatly 
enhance the transparency and accountability of these systems. The European Union has 
completed and provided recommendations on a framework to ensure responsible usage of AI 
systems. This framework should be heavily considered for use in the United States in the 
future.  
The third conclusion from this study is the ever-evolving nature of this technology 
and the need for law enforcement to maintain technology literacy. New studies regarding AI 
systems and their impact on individuals are coming out on a regular basis. A lack of familiarity 
with technology was identified as a weakness by the Law Enforcement Forecasting Group in 
2018.216 If law enforcement does not recruit or invest in individuals that are aware of AI 
systems and their risks, then those law enforcement agencies are bound to either procure 
systems that do not fit their needs or utilize them in ways that may be detrimental to the 
community.  
216 Law Enforcement Forecasting Group, Increasing Analytic Capacity of State and Local Law 
Enforcement Agencies. 
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